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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the year that Grant Gilmore published his famed pronouncement
of the "death of contract," Congress enacted a statute in the interpretation of
which the federal courts have begun to resuscitate the formalist contract
doctrine that Gilmore said had died.' That statute is the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 In ERISA, Congress rejected an
administrative-regulation approach to employee benefits in favor of an approach
that would necessarily rely heavily on the development of federal common law.
Although ERISA is a long and detailed statute, there are many issues which
ERISA does not address. Notably, ERISA says little about nonpension (also
known as welfare) benefit plans. 3 Because ERISA preempts all state law that
might otherwise fill the gaps, some courts have interpreted ERISA as calling
for the creation of federal common law wherever the statute has no explicit
provision regarding an issue.4 Other courts, apparently not recognizing the
I Gilmore actually assigned 1963 as the date of death, because in that year Stewart
Macaulay, whom Gilmore dubbed the Lord High Executioner of contract, published his
pathbreaking article, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOCIOLoGicAL Ray. 55 (1963). GRANT GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF CoMNRAcr 105 n.1
(1974).
In identifying the phenomenon that is the subject of this paper as the renaissance of
contract, I might be read as accepting Gilmore's premise that contract died. In fact, I do
not; I agree with Macaulay's assertion that "academic contract law is not now and never
was a descriptively accurate reflection of the institution in operation." Stewart Macaulay,
An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 465, 466.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3 ERISA divides employee benefit plans into two categories: those that provide
pensions (pension plans) and those that provide anything else (welfare benefit plans). 29
U.S.C. § 1002 (1988). Pension plans are subject to more stringent regulation than welfare
benefit plans because pension plans typically involve larger pools of assets than do welfare
benefit plans.
4 See generally Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that ERISA's legislative history demonstrates a
congressional intent that federal courts develop a federal common law); Menhorn v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing
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large role Congress intended for common law, treat the statute as if Congress
had created a "comprehensive and fully reticulated" statutory regime.5 Finding
few clear statutory guidelines, courts have concluded that many aspects of
employee benefits should remain unregulated rather than, as Congress more
likely intended, regulated by federal common law. In other words, courts act as
though they were engaged in a rather limited project of statutory construction
rather than a more involved project of creating federal common law.
Notwithstanding the twentieth-century expansion of contractual liability and
the "erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth century theory of
contractual obligation" chronicled by Gilmore, the federal common law of
contracts that courts have crafted for employee benefits takes a surprisingly
narrow view of contractual obligation. 6 Essentially, the only obligations that
courts will enforce are those reflected in written employee benefit plan
documents.7 And because the documents that courts will recognize as creating
an obligation to provide employee benefits are almost invariably written by the
employer's lawyers and are seldom subject to negotiation between employers
and individual employees, the terms are often unfavorable to employees. The
notions of consent and negotiation that legitimate contract as a form of social
ordering typically are absent from the relationship. What remains is a legal
guarantee of unrestrained managerial power. The irony is that the courts have
resurrected contract in all its laissez-faire and formalist glory under the aegis of
necessity of development of federal common law to fill in gaps in ERISA, to develop
ERISA standards, and to develop ERISA principles in areas that previously had been
exclusively matters of state law); EMPLOYEE BENEmrrs COMMrrre, SEc'ION OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAw, AmECAN BAR Ass'N, EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs LAw 611 (BNA 1991); Jay
Conison, Foundations of the Comon Law of Plans, 41 DEPAuL L. Rav. 575, 576-79
(1992).
5 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
6 FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTs, CASES AND MATERIALS 1118
(2d ed. 1970). The relationship between the erosion of rigid rules and the expansion of
contractual liability is the subject of Duncan Kennedy's masterful study, Form and
Substance in Pivate Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Kennedy's thinking
was obviously influenced by Lon Fuller's Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. RLy.
799 (1941).
7 The employee benefit plan "documents" to which I refer throughout this Article
usually consist of an instrument by which the employer establishes the plan as a trust and
which describes the plan in detail, and a document summarizing the plan terms, known as a
Summary Plan Description (SPD), which ERISA requires every employer or benefit plan
administrator to prepare and distribute to the employees. 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1988). The
SPD must describe the pertinent plan provisions in terms a layperson can comprehend. Id.
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legislation which was at least nominally supposed to protect employees against
the exercise of private power that nineteenth-century contract law had allowed.8
This renaissance of contract has occurred in the cases challenging
employers' efforts to amend plans to eliminate or reduce benefits for employees
with AIDS, 9 retirees, 10 or employees on strike.' 1 Consider the now-familiar
plight of the late John McGann. 12 After discovering that he had AIDS,
McGann sought reimbursement for medical treatment from his employer's
group medical plan. The plan comprehensively covered medical care for
employees of McGann's employer, H & H Music Company in Texas, and
provided for lifetime medical benefits of up to $1,000,000 per employee. Just
over six months later, faced with a sharp increase in premiums, H & H Music
changed its plan to limit coverage for AIDS to $5000, but imposed no similar
limit on other diseases. Pointing out that he was the only employee known to
have AIDS, McGann sued his employer for violating section 510 of ERISA,
which prohibits discrimination against employees for the exercise of rights
under the statute or a benefit plan. i3 McGann's theory was that the implicit
promise his employer made when offering health insurance was to provide
coverage in the event of illness. In singling out him and his illness for
drastically reduced coverage, H & H Music discriminated against McGann for
8 Setting aside, for the moment, both skepticism about whether congressional
declarations of policy in statutes can be accepted at face value, and the interest-group-deal
nature of ERISA that may limit one's ability credibly to claim that it was principally about
protecting employee expectations, I would note the avowed purposes of ERISA:
The Congress finds... that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate
safeguards concerning [the] operation [of employee benefit plans], it is desirable in the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare
and fiee flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with
respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans; ... that
... many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement
benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the
inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered ....
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
9 See McCann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
10 See, e.g., Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
11 See Manufacturing: UAW Alleges Caterpillar Violated ERISA by Denying
Pension Credits to Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 3, 1995).
12 McWnn, 946 F.2d 401.
13 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
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invoking the employer's promise. The Fifth Circuit was unpersuaded. The
court held that there was no discrimination because the amendment did not
deprive him of rights to which he was or would become entitled under the plan.
Inasmuch as the plan document reserved to the employer the right to "terminate
or amend the Plan at any time or terminate any benefit under the Plan at any
time," the court concluded, "[defendants broke no promise to McGann."14
Reasoning from the assumption that the employer never promised not to amend
the plan to eliminate benefits, the court determined that ERISA offered
McGann no protection against such an amendment. "McGann's claim," the
court concluded, "cannot be reconciled with the well-settled principle that
Congress did not intend that ERISA circumscribe employers' control over the
content of benefits plans they offered to their employees." 15 The court saw the
formal, written limits on promised obligation as determinative. If defendants
"broke no promise," that was the end of the matter. 16 No other sort of unfair
disappointment of expectations, no other breach of trust, and no other self-
interested dealing would violate the statute. 17
The court faced a genuine dilemma in McGann. On the one hand, McGann
had a reasonable expectation that the existence of health insurance meant that
his medical costs would be paid in the event he became sick. H & H Music, on
the other hand, presumably believed that its obligation to provide health
insurance encompassed, at most, only an obligation to incur reasonable
expenses in doing so. Unanticipated circumstances meant that reasonable
expectations had to be disappointed. Rather than searching outside the terms of
the insurance document for a fair principle for dividing the unexpected losses,
the Fifth Circuit defined the only enforceable obligations as being those
explicitly guaranteed by the terms of the insurance plan.18 The court's rigidly
formalist understanding of the nature of right and obligation reflects an inability
to imagine how to protect inchoate expectations without creating sweeping and
vague entitlements.
In this Article, I explore the nature of and the reasons for the persistence of
laissez-faire contractualism in the employee benefits relationship. It would
advance understanding little to portray this manifestation of laissez-faire
contract discourse either as an absurd attempt to discern some fictive intent of
the parties, or as a bald-faced effort by conservative judges to help business at
14 McGann, 946 F.2d at 405 (emphasis added).
151dX at 407.
16 Id. at 405.
17 McGoath v. Auto-Body North Shore, Inc., 7 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1993), presented a
similar situation involving discriminatory amendments to a pension plan. The Seventh
Circuit reached the same result as the Fifth Circuit did in McGann.
18 McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
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the expense of employees. It is more interesting to consider how the doctrine
reveals a certain ideology of social insurance and a limited vision of the role
that federal courts should play in devising a system of rights and remedies
when Congress both failed to do so itself and, by preempting all state law,
made it impossible for the states to do so.' 9
Courts, I will argue, resorted to contract notions in an unsatisfactory
attempt to resolve a serious tension between the two faces of ERISA: its
voluntarist face and its regulatory face. In its voluntarist aspect, ERISA reflects
a preference for voluntary private arrangements over governmental structures
to address the problems of income insecurity in a capitalist economy. I use the
term "voluntarism" to mean a preference for private ordering over public
arrangements as a source of rights and obligations. The voluntarism is reflected
in Congress's decision to leave to employer choice whether to provide pension
or welfare benefits and, more starkly, its failure to require vesting of
nonpension benefits.20 ERISA is a mainly voluntarist approach to the problem
of social insurance. In it, Congress sought to encourage, but not to require,
employers to provide benefits. 21
It is also clear, however, that ERISA was animated at least in part by a
recognition that purely voluntary arrangements had allowed exploitation of
employees. 22 ERISA's regulatory face reflects Congress's recognition that
neither the market nor pre-existing state common law regulation of employee
19 ERISA's preemption provision has been construed to preempt all state regulation of
employee benefits, even where state laws affect employee benefit plans only indirectly. 29
U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). E.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113
S. Ct. 580 (1992) (stating that ERISA preempts a portion of the District of Columbia
workers' compensation law that prohibits employers from terminating health benefits of
workers receiving workers' compensation benefits).
20 ERISA does not require that an employer provide any benefits to its employees.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). If an employer does
provide benefits, ERISA requires that the plan provide for full vesting of an employee's
rights to receive pension benefits in no more than seven years. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)
(1988 & Supp. 1993). There is no comparable vesting requirement for nonpension benefits.
Since ERISA preempts all state law, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988), ERISA makes
unenforceable any state law requiring an employer to establish a benefit plan, Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), or to provide for vesting of nonpension benefits,
Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
21 The encouragement is provided by generous tax incentives. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1202(c) (1988); I.R.C. §§ 401-419A (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The tax exemptions for
employee benefit plans constitute the single largest tax expenditure in the entire United
States budget. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BuDGET, BuDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, tbl. 24-3, at 2-39 (1992).
22 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
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benefits adequately protected legitimate employee expectations in receiving
benefits. Congress also recognized that an imbalance of power between
employer and employee meant that neither the market nor the common law was
neutral as between them, and that economic conditions and legal rules enabled
employers unfairly to exploit employee trust.23 Therefore, Congress, in
ERISA, imposed a variety of restrictions on the administration of plans. In
particular, ERISA requires disclosure to employees and imposes fiduciary
duties on those with discretionary authority over plan administration and, with
respect to pension plans, requires vesting of benefits, adequate funding of
pensions, and protection of surviving spouses' claims to benefits, among other
things.
ERISA's voluntarist aspects make it clear that contract is not an entirely
inappropriate framework for analyzing rights and obligations in the benefits
context. Thus, the tension between voluntarism and regulation is a product of
congressional design: as long as employers are free not to provide pensions and
health insurance to their employees, and as long as our social insurance system
relies on employers voluntarily doing so, any regulatory regime faces a difficult
problem. Stringent regulation to protect employees will increase the cost of
benefits to employers and thus, at some point, will create an incentive for
employers to exercise their prerogative not to provide benefits at all.
Rather than developing federal common law rules that are responsive both
to the voluntarist and to the regulatory aims of ERISA, courts have eschewed
the regulatory and ameliorative aspects of modem contract law in favor of a
laissez-faire model. By treating documents as if they were negotiated contracts,
by enforcing boilerplate disclaimers, by refusing to consider any source of
obligation extrinsic to plan documents, and by refusing to impose liability
under quasi- or non-contractual theories such as promissory and equitable
estoppel, courts have accorded ERISA's voluntarist aspect more significance
than its regulatory aspect-more significance than it deserves or was intended
to have. To reconcile the voluntarist and regulatory sides of ERISA, courts
must be more skeptical about the realities of bargaining over health benefits and
the effectiveness of disclosure and implied consent, and should look to the
aspects of modem contract law that were developed to ameliorate discrepancies
of bargaining power and imperfect information.
My argument proceeds as follows. In Part II, I provide a brief sketch of the
background of ERISA. I show how its central voluntarist-regulatory tension
derives from reliance on pre-existing common law forms and concepts to effect
a new regulatory initiative that was supposed to constrain the very sort of self-
interested employer behavior that common law contract had long facilitated. I
also discuss the institutional problem confronting the courts in having to create
23 See infra text accompanying notes 28-45; 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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federal common law in the interstices of a statute that appears to be, but is not,
comprehensive and reticulated. Next, in Part I, I argue that courts turned to
laissez-faire contract discourse in developing a common law of employee
benefits, and that they did so for reasons not dissimilar to those that prompted
Gilded Age courts to create the constitutional right of liberty of contract as a
defense against legislative incursions into the exercise of private power.24 My
argument is analytical, not historical. I do not think we have to look all the way
back to the 1920s to find this same pattern; the same faith in voluntary private
ordering as the preferred form of social organization, which I call voluntarism,
has persisted through much of the history of labor and employment law.25 I
show that classical contract doctrine is ill-suited for the task of identifying and
resolving conflicts between the expectations of parties to an employee benefits
relationship, and I suggest that resort to a few modem equitable principles
would mitigate part of the problem, if only federal courts were not so hostile to
these concepts in ERISA cases.
In Part IV, I suggest reasons laissez-faire contract seemed to the courts to
be a logical choice of legal framework, an apparently anomalous choice of legal
paradigm for giving content to the commands of protective labor legislation. As
a discourse, contract has a particular appeal in this context: it is redolent of
notions of free choice, fairness, equality, and consent; it offers courts a
deceptively simple set of rules to apply to complicated relationships. The search
for clear rules that sharply delimit obligations, even when the social reality
suggests that obligations are diffuse and inchoate, is an appealing choice for
institutions with limited resources to devote to sorting out complicated
questions arising from a long-term employment relationship. The federal courts
are reluctant to turn themselves into insurance claims adjusters or labor
arbitrators, particularly without direction from Congress. One way to avoid
undertaling these responsibilities is to limit liability, and laissez-faire contract
is a ready-made legal structure that allows courts to do so.
24 When speaking about laissez-faire in this context, I think it is useful to observe the
two distinct meanings that Morton Horwitz saw in the term: the nineteenth-century
"contractarian ideology" was laissez-faire "in the traditional sense of being hostile to
legislative or administrative regulation." But laissez-faire is often meant to suggest a
systematic favoritism for capital, and in this sense the ideology was instrumental, "in the
sense of promoting economic development." MORTON HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at xv (1977).
25 Voluntarism should not be equated entirely with laissez-faire liberalism, but there is
intellectual common ground. Both philosophies share a preference for limited government
and maximal private autonomy.
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In sum, while ERISA's voluntarist approach made contract the all but
inevitable framework for employee benefits, courts have missed opportunities
to create a contract doctrine that might more equitably honor the interests of
employees as well as employers. And they have developed a doctrine without
sufficient sensitivity to the context of the employment relationship, which might
call for altering traditional contract doctrine that was developed for commercial
transactions among parties of equal sophistication.
The judges' laissez-faire contractualism is more than a bad habit learned in
law school. It is a deliberate policy choice about the supposedly undesirable
effects-on firms, on courts, and ultimately on employees-that would follow
from courts' decisions to intervene on behalf of workers when employee
benefit promises prove unreliable.
II. A PARAX OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE
In this part of the Article, as its title suggests, I draw on Holmes's
metaphor of the paradox of form and substance in the development of law26 to
describe the way that Congress borrowed pre-existing concepts in the creation
of ERISA, and judges borrowed traditional common law contract concepts to
give meaning to the new (and not well-defined or thoroughly elaborated)
provisions that Congress created. In Holmes's metaphor, the paradox of form
and substance in the law is that precedents (and I would add, conceptual
structures) survive in the law long after the circumstances that gave rise to them
have gone.27 I show that ERISA, as a regulatory regime, was in large part an
amalgam of past statutory and common-law contract and trust practice, but that
courts in interpreting it have unduly emphasized the traditional aspects and,
unfortunately, underemphasized the novel regulatory aspects of it.
A. The Framework of Federal Regulation of Employee Benefits
1. A Short History of the Regulation of Private Benefit Plans
After several infamous cases of wrongdoing in employee benefit plan
administration and a few spectacular private pension plan failures-the most
notable of which was the failure of the pension plan covering 11,000
autoworkers that accompanied the demise of the Studebaker auto manufacturer
in 1963-Congress decided to regulate private employee benefit plans. The
2 6 OLIVER W. HOLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAw 35 (1881); see infra text
accompanying notes 123-26, 243-44.27 HOLMES, supra note 26, at 35.
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federal government had made relatively weak and incomplete efforts to regulate
employee benefit plans in the Taft-Hartley Act of 194728 and in the Welfare
and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA),29 as well as in the
Internal Revenue Code, but much regulation remained a matter of state law
until Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.30 With the exceptions of tax law and
plans created by collective bargaining agreements, private employee benefit
plans were, until 1974, regulated mainly by state law. ERISA thus represented
an enormous undertaking and a novel federal statutory venture into areas of
substantive law and policy that previously had been matters of state common
law. Not surprisingly, Congress's approach to the problem was part historical
accident, part accretion of past practice, and part novel design.
ERISA is a hybrid. It is protective labor legislation that imposes minimum
standards on employee benefit plans and provides enforcement power to the
Department of Labor to protect employees, and it is also a tax scheme that
attempts to provide incentives to employers to maintain plans and to prevent
abuse of tax incentives. Because private pension funds represent the largest
pool of investment capital in the United States, ERISA's function as protective
labor legislation is tangled up with its function as a device to regulate capital
formation and financial intermediaries. 31 ERISA is administered both by the
Treasury Department and by the Department of Labor, a division of function
which reflects the fact that, historically, national private pension policy was
entirely a matter of tax incentives until the WPPDA gave the Labor
Department a limited oversight role in 1958. Since the legitimacy of the tax
breaks demanded some protection of employee pension expectations, Congress
and the Treasury conditioned the tax preferences on compliance with
requirements designed to protect employees' expectations in receiving
pensions. The hybrid structure led not only to serious problems of bureaucratic
disorganization, 32 but also to a schizophrenia of purpose.33 This confusion
28 Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
29 Id. §§ 301-309 (repealed 1974).
30 This issue and the literature on it are discussed in Conison, supra note 4, at 583-89.
31 For an explanation of the significance of pension funds as financial intermediaries,
see PAUL P. HARBREcHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER (1959). As Harbrecht
points out, pension funds are comparable to other forms of financial intermediation such as
banking, insurance, and securities markets, all of which have reshaped capitalism in the late
twentieth century. On the significance of financial intermediation, see Robert Clark, The
Four Stages of Capitalism: Refleclions on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 561 (1981).
3 2 See Beverly M. Klimkowsky & Ian D. Lanoff, ERISA Enforcement: Mandate for a
Single Agency, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 89 (1985).
3 3 Whereas the WPPDA was intended mainly to protect workers, ERISA, as modified
by the tax committees during the legislative process, reflected as much concern for reducing
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profoundly affects what courts can say about what Congress intended in
enacting it. Therefore, in the many circumstances in which the statute is
ambiguous or silent, the intent of the statute is equally inscrutable. This creates
serious interpretive problems for courts.
To understand the conceptual vision underlying ERISA, one must bear in
mind the historical context in which it was designed and appreciate a deep
ambivalence about the proper role of government in providing social insurance.
The 1960s, when Congress began to design ERISA, were years of boundless
optimism about what the federal government could do. When ERISA was
enacted, some in Congress may have believed that making employee benefits
an area of exclusive federal concern was merely the first part of a new phase in
the construction of the American welfare state. And even among those who
thought it was not a prelude to radical change, the legislative history suggests
there was consensus that ERISA's particular provisions were provisional and
experimental. 34 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the skeptics came
taxpayer abuse as for protecting workers. Nancy 1. Altman & Theodore R. Marmor, ERISA
and the American Retirement Income System, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 31, 35 (1988). ERISA
was in significant respects more than just a compromise; it was an interest-group deal
between large employers, pension consultants, organized labor, insurers, and financial
advisors of all sorts. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted, in U.S.
SENATE SPECIAL Comm. ON AGING, 98th Cong., 2d Seass. (1984), THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECuRrry ACr oF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 19-22.
34 The statute itself recognizes that the effects of its novel regulatory efforts should be
subject to study and revision; it provided for creation of committees to study the effect of
various provisions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 3022(a)(4), 1222(a)(5) (1988) (creating the Joint
Pension Task Force to study the effects of preemption of state law); Id. §§ 1142, 1143. The
principal sponsor of the bill in the Senate, Jacob Javits, explained the need for further study
of the preemption of state law:
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a policy-also agreed to assign the
Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of studying and evaluating
preemption in connection with State authorities and reporting its findings to the
Congress. If it is determined that the preemption policy devised has the effect of
precluding essential legislation at either the State or Federal level, appropriate
modifications can be made.
120 CoNG. REC. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); see also 120 CONG. REC.
4278 (Feb. 26, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Perkins); 120 CONG. REC. 29,929 (Aug. 22, 1974)
(remarks of Sen. 'Williams). The provisional nature of ERISA is discussed in Conison, supra
note 4, at 576-77.
Unfortunately, the Joint Pension Task Force, which was supposed to study the effects
of ERISA preemption, did not receive adequate funding to complete its work. Thus,
although the statute was intended to be subject to further revision in light of experience, the
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to the fore.35 As confidence in federal regulation plummeted, the construction
of the new welfare state drew to a halt. What had been provisional became
permanent. ERISA had swept away existing state common law regulation of
benefits and preempted any further state legislative or judicial efforts to
regulate in the field, but had put little in the place of what was dismantled. 36
Like an urban renewal project that ran out of funds after the old neighborhood
was razed, the federalization of social insurance abruptly ceased before the
project was complete. Reluctant federal judges have had to pick through the
rubble to begin constructing some sort of structure for employee benefits that
Congress sketched out but did not completely design.
In the early 1970s, states had begun to regulate employee benefits, and
ERISA preempted these state statutes. Hawaii, for example, had created a
mandatory employer-provided health insurance system that guaranteed virtually
every state resident health insurance, which ERISA does not.37 Minnesota
created a pension protection system that would have been preempted by ERISA
had the Supreme Court not invalidated it on other grounds.38 We will never
know what innovative solutions to the problem of social insurance state courts
and legislatures might have developed had ERISA not cut short all such state
common-law or statutory experimentation. 39
studies of experience have not materialized, and few "appropriate modifications" have been
made.
35 For an excellent historical discussion of changing attitudes towards regulation, see
THoMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES F "ANCs ADAMS, Louis D.
BRANDIS, TAmES M. LkNDIs, ALFED E. KAHN (1984).3 6 ERISA supersedes "any and all" state laws "insofar as" they "relate to" an
employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Courts have construed this preemption
provision extremely broadly. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of
Trade, 113 S. CL 580 (1992); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
37 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1985 & Supp. 1992). After the courts held
that ERISA preempted Hawaii's statute, the senators from Hawaii pushed through Congress
a partial exemption to ERISA preemption for Hawaii's statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A)-
(C) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Hawaii's experience in making health benefits a matter of
entitlement rather than contract has been the subject of much study in the recent national
health care reform debate.
38 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181B.01-181B.17 (West 1993). The Supreme Court struck
down the Minnesota statute as violating the federal constitutional proscription on state laws
impairing the obligations of contracts. Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234
(1978). My voluntarism thesis is buttressed by the Supreme Court's characterization of the
regulation of pensions as one of the very few violations of the Contracts Clause it has found
since the Lochner era. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAw 400-04 (4th ed. 1991).
3 9 See generally Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining:
Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE RISE AND
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2. ERISA's Protections: Disclosure and Fiduciary Obligations
With limited exceptions, ERISA applies to all employee benefit plans
maintained by any employer or union affecting commerce except government-
and church-sponsored plans, and plans maintained solely to comply with state
workers' compensation, unemployment, or disability insurance laws.4 In
simplest terms, ERISA requires those who maintain employee benefit plans to
disclose the terms of the plan to the participants and to report the terms to the
federal government. It imposes fiduciary duties on those who administer plan
assets and make benefit eligibility determinations. In addition, ERISA imposes
further and important restrictions on pension plans, but not on nonpension
plans: it requires that a plan grant vested, nonforfeitable rights to benefits, and
it prohibits discrimination in eligibility for participation. It also conditions the
availability of tax benefits on compliance with statutory requirements for
pensions, but grants tax benefits to welfare benefit plans regardless of whether
they comply with the statute.41 Thus, the core notions are disclosure and
fiduciary duties and, as to pensions, vesting of rights and regulation of
participation.
Congress did not invent many of the concepts on which its regulatory
framework depends. Fiduciary duties had applied since the earliest benefit
plans were established as trusts. The WPPDA had previously used reporting
requirements. 42 Participation requirements and vesting rules had been
developed by private-sector employee benefit specialists, and the Internal
Revenue Code already incorporated some of them. ERISA simply codified and
established minimum standards that did not differ radically from existing
practice. 43 Thus, ERISA was in some respects nothing more radical than a
federal codification of the existing regulatory and contractual practices, not a
dramatic reform. Congress's great leap forward in the protection of employees
stumbled over the fact that much in the statute was not a radical reform.
In enacting ERISA, Congress gave sustained attention to the problems of
pension plans, and the statute reflects this careful consideration. Congress gave
relatively little thought to the problem of health benefits, apart from joint
union-employer Taft-Hartley funds, because the highly publicized problems in
welfare benefits were mainly fraud and sharp practices in the administration of
FALL OF THE New DEAL ORDER 1930-1980, at 122 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds.,
1989).
40 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (1988); LR.C. §§ 419-419A (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
42 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1988) (repealed 1974).
43 STEPHENR. BRUCE, PENSION CLAImS: RiGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 2-3 (2d ed. 1993).
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union funds. 44 There was enough concern in the early 1970s about the need to
protect nonunion employee expectations in receiving welfare benefits to prompt
Congress to include those plans within the coverage of the statute. But the
sharp increases in health care costs that would reveal the incongruence between
employer and employee interests were still some years away.
The application to welfare benefits of disclosure and fiduciary duty rules,
but not vesting requirements, was premised on Congress's perception that fraud
and shady dealing in Taft-Hartley funds were the principal problems afflicting
the nonpension benefit system. In 1974, that was not an unreasonable
perception. Vesting was not thought necessary for nonpension benefits because
Congress did not consider the possibility that then-existing assumptions about
health care costs would turn out to be wrong. Congress did not anticipate that
employers-absent any fraudulent or illicit motives-would have interests at
odds with those of employees and have the power to defeat systematically
employee expectations that employers themselves had encouraged.
The legislative history makes it clear that Congress deliberately rejected the
possibility of requiring vesting of welfare benefits. The House and Senate
Reports on the bill state that "[t]o require the vesting of these ancillary benefits
would seriously complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans
whose primary function is to provide retirement income." 45 The need to
protect the expectations of active employees and retirees did not seem pressing
enough to outweigh the costs to employers and the administrative difficulties
that vesting would impose. But there is nothing in the legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended its judgment about the lack of need for statutory
vesting to foreclose common law responses to changed circumstances consistent
with the statute's protective purposes. Indeed, in charging courts with the
responsibility of developing common law to flesh out the statute's minimum
standards, Congress presumably expected that the courts would take the
protective purposes of the statute as a starting point. Given that employee
expectations of continued health coverage are being disappointed today, much
as employee's pension expectations were being disappointed before Congress
enacted ERISA, Congress may have expected the courts to fashion protections
that Congress did not create expressly. Instead, courts have assumed just the
opposite: because Congress did not create protections, the courts have seemed
to assume that employees were to be left unprotected.
44 See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
45 H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4726; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 51, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4890,4935.
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3. Filling in the Blanks. Federal Common Law
ERISA regulates some aspects of plans in mind-boggling detail.46 But parts
of plan administration, some of which are extremely important, receive only
the sketchiest mention in the statute. For example, because the vesting rules
apply only to pension plans, ERISA says nothing about an employer's power to
eliminate welfare benefits that it previously promised to provide. Nor does
ERISA say anything about the circumstances under which a plan participant is
entitled to recover disputed benefits from a plan, except to authorize suits to
recover such benefits. 47 The dividing line between extensive and sketchy
regulation in the statute runs roughly along the line between pension and
welfare benefit plans. For instance, in requiring that employees' rights to
pension benefits vest after a period of years, Congress committed itself to
providing detailed subsidiary rules to be sure that employees had vested rights
to something of value. Hence, Congress provided elaborate rules governing the
rate at which pension benefits must accrue, the funding that a pension plan
must maintain to ensure assets are available to pay promised benefits, and the
like.48 But for welfare benefit plans, Congress did little more than make plan
administrators fiduciaries, require reporting and disclosure, and provide a cause
of action in federal court for breach of those duties or of the terms of a plan.49
Because ERISA preempts all state regulation of employee benefit plans,
ERISA's sketchy provisions are the only legal regulation of plans. 50 The result
is that large parts of the legal structure governing plans, especially welfare
benefit plans, must be developed by the courts as a matter of federal common
law.51
46 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1054 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (vesting and accrual
rules for pension plans).
47 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(3) (1988).
4 8 Id. §§ 1054, 1082-1085.
49 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1003, 1023, 1102, 1109, 1132(a)-(d) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
50 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
5 1 The legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended the federal courts to
create a common law to govern at least some areas not covered by the Title I minimum
standards. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 3 ERISA
nIxs. HIsT. 4594 (1976); see also Sampson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 108,
110 (1st Cir. 1988); Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir.
1984). On ERISA as providing authority for the creation of federal common law, see
Conison, supra note 4, passim, and BRUCE, supra note 43, at 301-05.
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Federal courts have authority to fashion federal common law when
Congress's intent that they do so is clear. 52 Congress's intent that ERISA
provide a mandate for courts to create federal common law under ERISA is
clear both from the structure of the statute, inasmuch as Congress preempted all
state law and did not draft statutory provisions to cover every issue, and from
the legislative history.53 Nevertheless, the fact that ERISA itself contains many
detailed provisions on many subjects has prompted courts to take the view that
ERISA is comprehensive, and consequently courts have been less creative
about fashioning additional liabilities than they might have been had the statute
been sketchier, as in the cases of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act or the
Sherman Act.54 The courts have been reluctant to imply additional rights or
remedies in the statute, and thus ERISA often is held to preempt state law
claims and yet to provide no remedy for the injured employee.55 Instead, courts
treat the task almost as if they were deciding whether to imply a private right of
action in a statute that provides no remedies for harms to individuals56 rather
than acting on a mandate to create federal common law in a statute that was
intended to remedy private harms and to be enforced by those whom it
protects.
In developing common law under ERISA, courts have been plagued by the
crucial tension that Congress did not resolve: the notion that ERISA should
function to protect employees' expectations inevitably conflicts with the notion
that ERISA should foster the growth of private employee benefit plans by
preserving employers' economic prerogative over the labor force and the costs
5 2 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). On the
creation of federal common law, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION ch. 6 (2d ed. 1994).
53 See supra note 51. In the final debate on ERISA, Senator Jacob Javits, the principal
Senate sponsor of the legislation, stated that Congress "intended that a body of Federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 3 ERISA LEs. HIST. 4771 (1976).
54 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988) (T'aft-Hartley Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (Sherman Act); see BRUCE, supra note 43, at 301.
55 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (finding a
permanently disabled worker's state law tort claim for work-related injury "relate[d] to" the
employee benefit plan and therefore was preempted by ERISA); Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (refusing to recognize a claim for
extracontractual damages for breach of fiduciary duty because ERISA contains an
"interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a
comprehensive and reticulated statute" (citation and internal punctuation omitted)); Olson v.
General Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir.), cert. derded, 112 S. Ct. 2968 (1992);
Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986).
56 See generally C M sKy, supra note 52, §§ 7.6-7.7.
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associated with labor. Congress was at least dimly aware of the tension
between ERISA's voluntarist and regulatory aims at the time it enacted the
statute. As the principal Senate sponsor of the legislation, Jacob Javits,
explained:
The problem, as perceived by those who were with me on this issue in the
Congress, was how to maintain the voluntary growth of private plans while at
the same time making needed structural reforms in such areas as vesting,
funding, termination, etc., so as to safeguard workers against loss of their
earned or anticipated benefits-which was their principal cause of complaint
and which-over the years-had led to widespread frustration and bitterness.
[The] new law represents an overall effort to strike a balance between the
clearly-demonstrated needs of workers for greater protection and the
desirability of avoiding the homogenization of pension plans into a federally-
dictated structure that would discourage voluntary initiatives for further
expansion and improvement. 57
Although Javits referred only to pension plans, there is no reason to think
that Congress had different aspirations for nonpension plans. In the statute
itself, this tension is reflected in the difference between the treatment of pension
and nonpension benefits; the former are statutorily nonforfeitable after a period
of years, whereas the latter are not. ERISA circumscribes the pension bargain
in various ways and holds the employer to it with government insurance to
protect employees when employers cannot pay. With respect to nonpension
benefits, ERISA does neither. In adopting a regulatory framework that relies on
employer incentives that are often at odds with employee interests, ERISA left
to the courts the task of resolving the tension ad hoc.
In confronting this tension, courts have been conservative about creating
common law liabilities to fill gaps in the statute. Generally, the only obligations
that courts view ERISA as imposing are those explicitly stated in the statute
and those that employers set out in plan documents. The federal common law
thus focuses mainly on the interpretation of plan instruments and on the
meaning and application of the fiduciary and disclosure duties. Although
modem rules of contract interpretation allow for expansive implied liabilities,
the rules of interpretation that the courts employ in ERISA cases generally do
not. Thus, with a few exceptions, courts have not looked to the rules under
state insurance law to reflect the fact that plans, like insurance policies, are
contracts of adhesion between parties of disparate knowledge and power.58
57 Gordon, supra note 33, at 25.
5 8 See BRuCE, spra note 43, at ch. 7; Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437,
1441 (9th Cir. 1990). One of the exceptions is Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 898
F.2d 1421, 1425-28 (9th Cir.) (adopting, as a matter of federal common law, the California
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Further, courts limit themselves to plan terms, rejecting any and all parol
evidence that might create broader (or narrower) liabilities. And, beyond
interpretation, courts often refuse to impose liability under any of the modem
theories that have evolved to redress inequities when no formal contractual
obligation can be found; courts seldom allow recovery based on promissory
estoppel, equitable estoppel, mistake, unconscionability, equitable reformation,
restitution, or the like.59
Nothing in the legislative history of ERISA compels this conservatism in
creating implied rights under the statute. If it were clear that Congress rejected
vesting of welfare benefits because it valued employer flexibility above all else,
the case against judicial recognition of implied obligations would be
unassailable. But it is not clear that Congress made such a judgment. Rather,
Congress intended to encourage employers to create plans and federal courts to
hold employers to the terms of those plans, and thereby to protect employee
expectations.
B. Voluntarism and Entitlements Within the Sphere of Contract
1. The Tension Between Voluntarism and Entitlements
The great reform that ERISA is supposed to have effected was to transform
private employer largesse into a contractual right, and to protect employees
further by imposing fiduciary standards developed under the common law of
trusts. The idea was that traditional legal jurisprudence of contract and trust
could be harnessed to protect employees.
In adopting the voluntarist model, Congress bypassed other models for
approaching the problem of social insurance. Congress could have created a
system of entitlements, such as it considered recently for health care, in which
every person is entitled to have his or her employer provide health insurance, a
pension, paid sick leave, disability insurance, child care, and so forth. Or
Congress could have committed the public treasury to providing these
assurances. Either of these entitlements approaches would have generated
problems of equitable distribution, implementation, federal-state relations, and
governmental oversight. Under an entitlements approach, Congress would have
had to confront these issues directly. As it is, the issues remain, but are being
dealt with indirectly, piecemeal, and by courts, with relatively little statutory
direction.
rule that ambiguities in insurance polices will be construed in favor of the insured), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1013 (1990).
59 See cases cited infra notes 210-16, 218-21.
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But ERISA does not entirely jettison the entitlement notion. Certainly the
vesting rules in the pension context represent quasi-entitlements. 60 Although
the case for entitlement to nonpension benefits is harder to make because
Congress clearly chose not to require vesting, the ethos of the statute-
assuming it makes any sense to talk of an ethos that is not fully translated into
statutory commands-is about protecting employees' expectations and ensuring
that employees receive promised benefits. Congress wanted flexibility and
simplicity in welfare benefit plans, and for that stated reason did not require
vesting of welfare benefits. Making employer-provided health insurance an
employee benefit rather than an employment right offers the allure of
flexibility. Requiring disclosure of benefit terms, making promises enforceable
in federal court, and making plan administrators fiduciaries evidences a desire
that flexibility not completely dominate employee expectations. By imposing
fiduciary duties and obligations to disclose, Congress limited self-interested
action by employers, acknowledged disparities of bargaining power, and
recognized that preexisting contract law had allowed frustration of employee
expectations. Thus, although ERISA creates no substantive entitlements to
welfare benefits, its formal requirements have substantive purposes and effects.
It is difficult, however, to reconcile the regulatory and voluntarist faces of
ERISA without turning welfare benefits into broad entitlements. If employee
expectations become entitlements, employers may be confronted with
potentially serious unanticipated costs. If expectations do not become
entitlements, employees are left with reduced protection. This is the tension
with which courts struggle in the welfare benefit amendment cases. 61
Having chosen the voluntarist model over a pure entitlements model, it was
inevitable that a contract paradigm of some sort would develop. But there is
60 ERISA imposes statutory vesting requirements on pension benefits; hence,
employees are fully vested after a maximum of seven years and so the same problems of
defeated expectations do not arise. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
61 The voluntarist-regulatory duality is perhaps the yin and yang of the American legal
tradition, and certainly of the law of contracts, as is made clear in a contracts casebook:
Kessler and Sharp, and later Kessler and Gilmore, saw contracts as an expression of the
political philosophy and ideological struggles of this nation. On one hand, there was an
ideal of free contract and a minimal limited state. This was rationalized in the name of
freedom and unleashing creative energies. On the other hand, there always was a
countertheme calling for regulation in various forms seeking substantive justice. Kessler
and Sharp saw American contract law as expressing theme and countertheme,
overgeneralizations and overcorrections. In short, they saw it as contradictory.
1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CoNTRACrs: LAW IN ACION 23 (1991-92 ed.) (on file with
author).
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contract law and there is contract law. Some versions of contract law recognize
implied rights to a greater extent than others. For example, state statutes
regulating insurance and state common law that restricts discharge from
employment both blend contract and implied-right notions.62 One can infer
from the fiduciary and disclosure obligations a congressional intent to license
courts to create a common law that would structure the benefits relation as one
of fairness and commitment as opposed to self-interest and arm's length
transacting. But courts have not read the statute in that way, and that has been a
crucial mistake. Essentially, courts read ERISA in the nonpension context as
providing little protection for employees other than disclosure. So long as
employers disclose through a written disclaimer that they retain the right to
eliminate benefits at will, courts will impose no limits on the employers'
prerogative. In this manner, courts effectively allow employers to opt out of
ERISA's regulatory goals by disclosure, and courts presume employee consent.
If we allow opting out of regulation through disclosure and implied consent,
even where disclosure and consent are largely fictional, voluntarism will
entirely swallow regulation.
Courts have not been especially inventive in exploring the space between
unconstrained managerial flexibility and broad employee expectations in the
welfare benefit cases. It is here that the courts' vision of their work as statutory
interpretation rather than as common law development is most apparent.
2. The Tension Manifested in the Presunption Against Vesting
The tension between voluntarism and entitlements, and the limits of the
contract paradigm in addressing this tension emerge most clearly in cases
discussing whether there should be a presumption that welfare benefits vest.
The contract principles that courts have developed for these cases have
responded to the tension between voluntarism and entitlements by capitulating
almost entirely to the demands of voluntarism. As I will show, courts usually
proceed directly from the observation that ERISA does not dictate the content
of welfare benefit plans to the proposition that courts ought not impose any
obligation on an employer apart from the ones the employer anticipated in the
plan documents. 63 The courts typically reason that: (a) ERISA does not
62 See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (citing cases and
commentary on the evolving law of wrongful termination); Wrongful Discharge From
Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-905, 39-2-911 to 39-2-915
(1993).
63 E.g., Senn v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 816-17 (7th Cir.)
(discussing presumption against vesting of health benefits in construing a collective
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require an employer to provide benefits; (b) ERISA requires vesting of pension
benefits; and (c) the legislative history is clear that Congress did not intend to
require vesting of nonpension benefits. 64 From these three postulates courts
infer not only that ERISA does not require vesting, but that-and this involves
a further logical step-in the absence of some explicit written agreement,
ERISA directs courts to presume that welfare benefits do not vest.65 Thus,
courts read ERISA as creating a presumption that welfare benefits do not vest.
The most extensive analysis of the presumption against vesting is in the
Seventh Circuit's en bane decision in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.66 In
Bidlack, retirees sued their former employer, Wheelabrator, claiming that
collective bargaining agreements between Wheelabrator and the union
conferred rights to health benefits that survived the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement), cet. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1992). In Moore v. Metropolitan Life
Insance Co., the court dealt with the problem of vesting as follows:
Automatic vesting does not occur in the case of welfare plans, and Metropolitan clearly
reserved in the plan documents and in the "SPDs" or summary plan descriptions the
right to amend or teninate the plans at issue....
Congress intended that plan documents and the SPDs exclusively govern an
employer's obligations under ERISA plans. This intention was based on a sound
rationale. Were all communications between an employer and plan beneficiaries to be
considered along with the SPDs as establishing the terms of a welfare plan, the plan
documents and SPDs would establish merely a floor for an employer's future
obligations. Predictability as to the extent of future obligations would be lost ....
856 F.2d 488, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., Inc., 889
F.2d 1346, 1350 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts should hesitate to impose upon companies
unwritten contractual liabilities. Payment of severance benefits here would constitute a
significant, unforeseen, and costly liability."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990).
64 See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993); Senn,
951 F.2d 806; McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); Reichelt v. Emhart Corp., 921 F.2d 425, 430 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1231 (1991); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d
1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1990); Sejman, 889 F.2d at 1348; Musto v. American General Corp.,
861 F.2d 897, 901 n.2 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989); Moore, 856
F.2d at 491.
65 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985); Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983); Bidlack, 993 F.2d 603; United Paperworkers
Int'l Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 771 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aifd, 961 F.2d
1384 (8th Cir. 1992).
66 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
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bargaining agreement at the closure of the plant. The district court granted
summary judgment for Wheelabrator, determining that neither the collective
bargaining agreement nor the health plan documents revealed an intent to grant
benefits beyond the term of the collective bargaining agreement, and held that
extrinsic evidence of such an intent was inadmissible. The Seventh Circuit took
the case en banc before the three-judge panel issued any opinion and reversed
the district court, ruling that the contract was ambiguous and that extrinsic
evidence is admissible to show the parties' intent.67 On the threshold question
of when a contract should be deemed ambiguous on the vesting of benefits, the
court recognized the need for a rule or a presumption for identifying ambiguity.
It is in this context that the court considered the problem of default rules about
vesting.
Judge Posner's plurality opinion rejected what he characterized as the
"extreme position" that "the contract must either use the word 'vest' or must
state unequivocally that it is creating rights that will not expire when the
contract expires." 68 This approach, Judge Posner wrote, "could be defended
only as a means of making life simpler for courts by creating a form that
parties must use to create enforceable rights and obligations." 69 Posner
acknowledged that courts invented the common law doctrine requiring
consideration for a contract for this purpose, but he concluded that "courts
should be cautious about adding formal hoops that contract parties must jump
through" to obtain enforcement of their agreement. 70 The plurality also rejected
what Judge Posner characterized as "[t]he second extreme, that of allowing
parties to substitute oral testimony for contractual language," because it
"depriv[es] parties of the protection of a written contract." 71 For a similar
reason, the plurality rejected a third rule that would allow admission of
extrinsic (or parol) evidence when a contract was completely silent on the
question of retiree benefits. Perceiving no reason to assume that benefits should
vest, the plurality thought that allowing the use of extrinsic evidence to create
obligations not mentioned in the contract "would unjustifiably deprive the
parties of the limitation of liabilities that is implicit in the negotiation of a
written contract having a definite expiration date."72 In Posner's view,
contracts are both a source of rights and a sort of defensive wall against
obligations that one party may think arise over the course of a relationship. The
67 Id. at 608.
6 8 Id. at 607.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
7 2 Id. at 608.
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plurality therefore adopted a rebuttable presumption that benefits do not vest
and allowed the use of extrinsic evidence to rebut the presumption.
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Judge Cudahy, joined by Judges
Ripple and Rovner, characterized the plurality opinion as rejecting a "strong
no-vest" rule and a "parol substitution rule" in favor of a "weak" no-vest rule
which would allow extrinsic evidence but would otherwise presume no
vesting. 73 Judge Cudahy explored other possible rules: a strong vest rule, a
weak vest rule, and a parol substitution rule that defaults to vesting rather than
to no vesting. In arguing for a weak vesting rule rather than the plurality's
weak no-vesting rule, Judge Cudahy asserted that a presumption of vesting
more accurately reflects the parties' likely intent:
I may see a different social reality within which these agreements were entered.
Before about 1980, I seriously doubt that it occurred to many employers to
grant retiree health benefits on anything less than a lifetime basis. The
overwhelmingly prevalent trend of labor contracts was to continue or improve
retiree benefits from contract to contract. It was only in the eighties, with
spiraling medical costs, heightened foreign competition, epidemic corporate
takeovers and the declining bargaining power of labor, that thought was first
given to reducing retiree benefits from contract to contract .... 74
In Cudahy's view, the contract is only a partial expression of the obligations
that arise in a relationship, and the law ought to recognize and enforce the full
range of obligations.
In dissent, Judge Easterbrook defended a strong presumption against
vesting. He offered two reasons why courts should presume no vesting in the
absence of explicit contract language. First, in his view, "as the duration and
cost of the supposed promise increase," so too should "the level of formality
required to conclude that a promise exists." 75 Presumably Judge Easterbrook
thought such a rule necessary either to protect against false claims of breach of
contract or because he thought parties write down all the important obligations
that arise over the course of their relationship. If the latter is not true (and
human experience with informal contracts suggests it is not), his former
justification for the rule would allow the obligor to take advantage of the
obligee's understandable reliance on the lack of need for a formal written
expression of all the significant terms of the relationship.
Judge Easterbrook located his second rationale for a no-vesting rule in the
nature of labor relations. Like Cudahy, he thought the nature of the relationship
73 Id. at 611.
74 Id. at 613.
75 Id. at 618.
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relevant to assessing the extent of obligation, but he drew very different
conclusions than Cudahy did from the nature of the relationship:
Unlike one-shot contracts for the sale of goods, labor agreements endure and
evolve. Relational contracting over long periods requires flexibility. What
worked yesterday may be counterproductive today.... When we use extrinsic
evidence to create long term promises, however, we defeat accommodation to
changed circumstances. Vesting means that however much labor and
management believe that a new approach is called for, they are forbidden to
achieve it: the employees, as third party beneficiaries, may enforce the old
agreements no matter what union and management now prefer.76
Easterbrook thus perceived a presumption of vesting as thwarting
management's desire to retain unconstrained discretion about when and if it
will assume responsibility for the retirees' expected welfare benefits. His is a
perfectly clear statement of the voluntarist ideology of social insurance.
The arguments as to why the employment relationship should give rise to a
presumption in favor of vesting, what Judge Cudahy called a strong vest rule,
are stated in United Automobile Workers v. Yard-Man,77 and, more recently, in
Armistead v. Vernitron Corp.78 In these cases, the courts focused principally on
the dependent status of retirees. Once retired, they lack the power to protect
themselves through negotiations. Because retirees are not represented by the
union in contract negotiations after retirement, the union has no duty to
consider their interests and only has an incentive to do so to the extent that the
issue is of concern to present employees. 79 Conceiving retirement welfare
benefits as "a form of delayed compensation or reward for past services," the
Yard-Man court thought it unlikely that such benefits "would be left to the
contingencies of future negotiations," particularly since the union has no duty
to bargain on behalf of retirees.80 Finally, because "retiree benefits are in a
76 Id.
77 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
78 944 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1991). In the years following Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit
backed away slightly from the broad language of "status benefits." See Smith v. ABS
Indus., Inc., 890 F.2d 841, 846 (6th Cir. 1989). But, as Anni5ead shows, it never entirely
abandoned it. See also Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984)
(explaining that summary judgment is appropriate only if the contract is unambiguous, and
that an employer must demonstrate that documents show that retiree medical insurance
expired with the collective bargaining agreement, and that all possible inferences must be
drawn in favor of retirees, as nonmoving parties).
7 9 See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157
(1971).
80 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
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sense 'status' benefits," in the courts' view, they "carry with them an inference
that they continue so long as the prerequisite status is maintained." 81
The Bidlack and Yard-Man opinions together present four different
approaches to the problem of identifying contractual ambiguity and presuming
contractual intent when a union and an employer bargained over the terms of
employment. Nothing in these cases addresses the very different concerns that
might arise when there has been no bargaining and when the plan has been
designed unilaterally by the employer and its lawyers. Nor do the opinions
satisfactorily address the effect that ERISA might have on the choice of
presumptions about vesting. They assume the existence of actual historical
intent on the part of both the union and the employer and simply seek a rule
that will most readily ascertain it or most closely approximate it. Where there
is no union, presumptions about the parties' intent are often misguided because
the parties to the plan generally do not share a contractual intent at the
formation of the benefits relationship.
When there is no bargaining, the choice of a default rule about vesting
must derive its legitimacy from some source other than the parties' intent and
the underlying notion of free and informed consent. If Congress made no
choice about vesting, and the parties made no choice, the judge must confront
his or her own responsibility for making the choice. Loath to do so, most
courts avoid the question, falling back on a questionable presumption of a
congressional choice. This imputed statutory presumption rests on unspoken
assumptions about entitlements in employment relations. Employee entitlements
are narrow exceptions to an expansive realm of employer prerogatives, power,
and property. Employee rights or entitlements are whatever is left over when
the court gets done defining an employer's rights of property and of control
over the terms of employment, labor costs and liabilities to its employees. 82
That employees would become entitled to lifetime health insurance because
they earned it, because they need it, or because the employer led them to
believe they would have it, strikes a court as a radical notion.
As will become apparent in the next part, the courts' formalist contract
discourse has a finger-in-the-dike quality to it. Against a widely held,, intuitive
sense that employee expectations of continued health care coverage are being
unfairly disappointed, courts maintain a rigid formalist view of the limits on
employer liability because they see the alternative as being limitless liability
81 Id.
82 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Mit Do Workers Want? Employee Interests,
Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 921 (1992).
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and an unfathomable morass of conflicting and undefined expectations.83 As
time has worn on, there seems increasingly to be a divergence between legal
norms and reasonable expectations. The courts' hesitance about creating
common-law entitlements that they would have to define and administer has led
them to create a formalist doctrine that has left substantially less room for
ameliorative solutions than there was in the beginning. The formalism has also
sidetracked the debate to battles over formal rules-like the written document
requirement-rather than focusing on the real issue, which is the problem of
allocation of loss and responsibility. The dissonance between the doctrine on
the one side, and the ethical sense and economic reality on the other, has led
the courts to retreat ever more into a mechanistic view of the law.84 Whatever
space there might have been for innovative legal interpretations of the
protections of ERISA has been reduced to the point that now the courts are
defending an exceedingly cramped reading of ERISA's protections against
popular disgust and discontent.
II. THE RENAISSANCE OF CONTRACT
Although the courts have been justified in adopting the position that the
nature and extent of benefit obligations is a matter of contract between
employer and employee, the contract law that they have designed is unduly
formalist and ill-suited to the task of fairly allocating the benefits and burdens
of the relationship. By formalism, I mean the notion that the proper decision
can be deduced from a pre-existing set of rules, which themselves are deduced
logically from largely determinate statutory directives. The courts' preferred
contract model reflects a skewed picture of employment relationships. I begin
this part of the Article by teasing out of selected laissez-faire era employment
cases the core elements of the contract discourse of that era. The laissez-faire
discourse is highly formalist, and liability must be based on consent or on the
clear commands of positive law. The discourse is abstract, and abstraction
ensures that the complex webs of expectations and the correspondingly diffuse
nature of obligations that people may feel in reality reduce to a limited and
clearly bounded set of legal obligations.
In the second section of this part of the Article, I explore the similarities of
the laissez-faire era discourse to the contract doctrine that the federal courts
have devised for employee benefits. First, I describe the contract doctrine that
courts have developed in the employee benefit context. The preeminent
83 See generally Leslie P. Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 1881 (1992).
84 See ROBERT M. CovER, JusTIcE AccusED: ANTISLAvERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 121, 198, 232 (1975).
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characteristic of the doctrine is an almost naive positivism: the relationship is
what the plan documents say it is. The courts defend this conclusion as
reflecting the parties' intent. To do so, they resort to two main rhetorical
devices: (1) they employ a trope of bargaining; and (2) they appeal to the
importance of formalities, especially the significance of written contract terms
and the dangers of allowing oral modifications of them. As I show, the notion
of parties' intent in this context is fundamentally incoherent. The courts'
rhetorical efforts to justify adherence to this approach twist the notion of
bargaining almost beyond recognition. In the third section of this part of the
Article, I show how these cases are a subset of a larger problem in employment
law: the difficulty of trying to shoehorn the parties' inchoate expectations and
the constantly evolving employment relationship into the fixed categories of
old-fashioned contract doctrine. Finally, I conclude this part by suggesting that
some principles of modern contract law-promissory and equitable estoppel-
could ameliorate some of the problems.
A. The Laissez-Faire Employwent Contract
Although the basic character of laissez-faire legal discourse is doubtless
known to us all, it is worth pausing to look at a few cases again. For,
notwithstanding the opprobrium that we have heaped on the old cases, the
similarity of discourse between them and modern employment cases is
startling. At the risk of being terribly reductionist, for the purposes of this
discussion I will posit the existence of four essential themes of the laissez-faire
era employment contract discourse: (1) legal (though not actual) equality of
employer and employee and a view of them as individuals rather than as
members of groups embedded in complex relationships; (2) the notion that
imposing any noncontractual obligation on employers is an unfair and socially
undesirable burden on business; (3) the notion that whatever moral claims
employees might have to an adequate standard of living is a claim that is
properly made against society, not employers; and (4) the notion that moral
claims are not cognizable in law. Let me use Adkins v. Children's Hospital85 as
an example to describe the essential elements of the laissez-faire vision of the
employment relationship. In Adkins, the Court invalidated a statute fixing
minimum wages for women and children on the grounds that it infringed the
liberty of contract protected by the Fifth Amendment. In reasoning to this
result, the Court made several observations about the employment relationship
and about the role of law in shaping that relationship that capture the Gilded
Age legal vision of employment relations.
85 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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The Court posited that employees and employers are equal in the eyes of
the law, and therefore have equal rights to "obtain from each other the best
terms they can as the result of private bargaining." 86 Given this formal
equality, the employer's liberty is unjustifiably infinged by "compelling him to
pay not less than a certain sum ... irrespective of the ability of his business to
sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of
abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a loss." 87 From this
standpoint, the minimum wage is "a compulsory exaction from the employer
for the support of a partially indigent person."88 Gone is the pre-nineteenth-
century view that the law had a role to play in defining a "fair" wage;89 rather,
any such legal regulation was a statutory wealth transfer from employer to
employee. The wealth transfer seemed unfair because the employer had "no
peculiar responsibility" for the financial plight of its workers, and the minimum
wage "therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if
it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole." 90 Thus, while
acknowledging the moral claim of every person to subsistence, the Court made
clear that it was not a claim that could be made on employers:
The ethical right of every worker, man or woman, to a living wage may be
conceded. One of the declared and important purposes of trade organizations is
to secure it. And with that principle and with every legitimate effort to realize
it in fact, no one can quarrel; but the fallacy of the proposed method of
attaining it is that it assumes that every employer is bound at all events to
furnish it.91
Since the employer has not caused the problem, in the Court's view the
employer is not obliged to remedy it: "Certainly the employer by paying a fair
equivalent for the service rendered, though not sufficient to support the
employee, has neither caused nor contributed to her poverty." 92 All of this
reasoning follows from the Court's perception that an employment relationship
is not fundamentally different from a contract for the sale of goods:
86 Id. at 545.
87 Id. at 557.
88 Id.
89 On the role of law in defining a "fair" wage for labor, see RoBERT J. SrER*NELD,
THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLIsH & AMERICAN
LAw AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991), and KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR,
THE LAW, AND LmERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNrrED STATES (1991).
90 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 558.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling labor and
the case of selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker or grocer to buy
food, he is morally entitled to obtain the worth of his money but he is not
entitled to more. If what he gets is worth what he pays he is not justified in
demanding more simply because he needs more; and the shopkeeper, having
dealt fairly and honestly in that transaction, is not concerned in any peculiar
sense with the question of his customer's necessities. 93
The Court saw nothing about the power structure of the employment
relationship, the long-term nature of the relationship, the trust that the
employer and employee must repose in each other, or the emotional
attachments that may form to suggest that the law should differ in this context
from that applicable to a one-shot commercial transaction between strangers.
The vision of employer and employee as lone, unattached individuals haggling
over the terms of their agreement and contracting de novo as if in a
marketplace was, as Roscoe Pound revealed, a seductively misleading but even
then anachronistic image:
Men have changed their views as to the relative importance of the
individual and of society; but the common law has not. Indeed, the common
law knows individuals only.... It tries questions of the highest social import
as mere private controversies between John Doe and Richard Roe. And this
compels a narrow and one-sided view .... 94
An additional theme in nineteenth-century liberty of contract discourse
about employment is the notion that protective legislation ultimately is not only
ineffectual but is actually bad for employees. Consider Justice Peckham's
famous argument for the legal equality of employee and employer in Lochner v.
New York-
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able
to assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the
State, interfering with their independence ofjudgment and of action.9 5
The notion is that employees are better off without the "protecting arm of the
State" interfering with their ability to secure whatever protections their
bargaining power can garner for them. And the contract discourse in the cases
is directed to advancing just this view.
93 Id. at 558-59.
94 Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law? 5 COLUM. L. Rnv. 339, 346
(1905).
95 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
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These same images appear throughout the old common-law employment
cases as well. In an oft-cited early case articulating the doctrine of employment
at will, Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co., the Tennessee Supreme
Court posited the equality of employer and employee in law, and likened the
employment relationship to a commercial transaction:
[Mien must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and
to discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or
even for bad cause without thereby being guilty for an unlawful act per se. It is
a right which an employe[e] may exercise in the same way, to the same extent,
for the same cause or want of cause as the employer. 96
The court also rejected the notion that the law could justly infringe an
employer's liberty to run its business and thus to retain its employees as it
deemed fit:
The sufficient and conclusive answer to the many plausible arguments to the
contrary, portraying the evil to workmen and to others from the exercise of
such authority by the great and strong, is: They have the right to discharge
their employe[e]s. The law cannot compel them to employ workmen, nor to
keep them employed. 97
To regulate, in the court's view, was unfairly to impose, for the good of
society or of some in it, an undue burden on the employer. As in Addns, the
court acknowledged that exercises of power by employers may be "censurable
and unjust."98 Yet, as in Adkins, the court professed the inability of the law to
deal with abuse of private power without severely infringing liberty: "[IThe
law can adopt and maintain no such standards for judging human conduct." 99
The image that the Payne court articulated of the relationship of a railroad
company to its employees was that of the head of a household to his family and
servants:
May I not refuse to trade with any one? May not I forbid my family to trade
with any one? May I not dismiss my domestic servant for dealing, or even
visiting, where I forbid? And if my domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my
mechanic, or teamster? And, if one of them, why not all four? And, if all four,
96 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884).
97 Id. at 520.
98 Id. at 517-18.
99 Id. at 518.
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why not a hundred or a thousand of them? The principle is not changed... by
the number.lo
The same discourse prevailed in early private pension cases. When Progressive
Era labor law scholars first focused on private pension plans in the early 1920s,
they likened the common-law treatment of pension promises to the law's
treatment of gifts l 10 1 Judicial rhetoric made the comparison easy. In McNevin
v. Solvay Process Co.,102 the New York Court of Appeals thought it obvious
that a pension plan was employer largesse, and that the employer, like any
philanthropist, could place whatever limits on his bounty that he thought
appropriate: "It must be conceded at the outset that a person or a corporation
proposing to give a sum for the benefit of any person or any set of persons has
the right to fix the terms of his bounty, and provide under what circumstances
the gift shall become vested and absolute." 10 3 The gift discourse persisted for
decades. In 1944, the Eighth Circuit observed that since "[n]o statute then in
force required of the company the assumption of the burden which it took upon
itself in providing for pensions for its employees, ... [the company] therefore
had the right to condition its bounty in such manner as it saw fit." 10 4 This so-
called "gift theory" of the pension promise, like the Payne court's metaphor
for the employer as head of a household, was part of the nineteenth-century
vision of the personal and hierarchical employment relation that is captured by
the legal characterization "master and servant."
B. The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract
In this section, I sketch the prominent features of the modem laissez-faire
discourse of employee benefits. After describing three main characteristics in
the first part of the section-formalism, a trope of bargaining, and a rhetoric of
private philanthropy-I turn in the second part of the section to the sociology of
"relational" contracts for a critique of this doctrine. Relational contract theory
could, I think, deepen judicial understanding of the employee benefits
relationship. To date, however, it has not had much impact in this field.
100 Id.
101 See generally MURRAY LATMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA (1932); WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS
AND PUBLIC PoLIcY (1976).
102 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), affd, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901) (per curiam).
103 Id. at 99.
104 Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944) (denying pension to
employee with over 45 years seniority because he participated in a three-month strike 10
years before retirement).
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1. Contract Discourse in Employee Benefit Cases
a. Formalism and Abstraction
The formalism of the contract discourse in modem employee benefit cases
is anomalous in today's contract law, and fits Roscoe Pound's description of
the "mechanical jurisprudence" of the Gilded Age: "rigorous logical deduction
from predetermined conceptions in disregard of and often in the teeth of actual
facts." 105 For example, the Seventh Circuit summed up the law governing the
power of a unionized employer to eliminate health benefits for retired
employees in Senn v. United Dominion Industries, Inc.,106 and made it quite
clear that bargaining, honoring of reasonable expectations, and consent to
contract terms are no part of the rules: that the retirees had worked in earlier
years in the expectation that they were receiving money today and health
benefits later would not matter. Because of the time limit on the collective
bargaining agreement, any subjective expectation they may have had was not
enforceable.107 In Senn, there was evidence that the company actually promised
lifetime benefits and that the retirees reasonably relied on that promise. In
rejecting their claim, the court invoked some sort of ironclad command of the
law, and disclaimed any responsibility for it: "We certainly are sympathetic to
the plight of retirees who may have erroneously thought that the company
would pay the cost of their life and health insurance throughout their lifetimes.
But we are not permitted to allow our sympathies and desires to vitiate clear
principles of contract and labor law .... . 1o 8 One may fault the court for
failing to identify the "clear principles" of law that compel its conclusion.
More importantly, the court's image of itself dutifully carrying out the dictate
of some unambiguous imperative of greater authority eclipses both the court's
own role in creating those principles of law and the lack of clarity in them.
Similarly, the courts' treatment of employer disclaimers evidences a most
primitive form of positivism. For instance, in Owens v. Storehouse, Inc. ,109 in
which an employee afflicted with AIDS argued that ERISA prohibits an
employer from eliminating coverage for AIDS once the employee has
contracted the disease, the court rejected the claim because the employer had
included in the plan documents a boilerplate reservation of rights to amend the
plan. The court concluded that the inclusion of the disclaimer in a plan meant
that the employer had not in fact bound itself to pay benefits and could not be
105 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 462 (1908).
106 951 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
107 Id. at 814.
108 Id. at 818.
109 984 F.2d 394 (lth Cir. 1993).
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held to have done so.110 In another case, the court held that a boilerplate
reservation of rights to amend or terminate a plan could be enforced, and the
court declined even to hear the evidence that the employees' union and the
employer had agreed otherwise during collective bargaining. 111 Because the
vested rights allegedly created during collective bargaining had not been
included in the terms of the insurance plan, and because the plan contained a
disclaimer, the court held that no other agreement conceivably could or did
exist.112
The courts' results in these cases are thus at odds with the trend in other
areas of contract doctrine-such as bailments and some consumer goods
contracts-where courts have declined to enforce such disclaimers as contrary
to public policy. The resemblance to pre-ERISA pension cases is unmistakable.
In making the written terms determinative, irrespective of any other evidence,
the court echoes the views of the Eighth Circuit in an early pension case: "By
the rules and regulations promulgated by the company..., the company only
obligated itself to pension such employees as the Board of Pensions, in the fair
exercise of the power conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the
benefits of the plan." 113 That the rules of the pension plan thus construed
promised the employees nothing did not appear to trouble the court then, but
such an approach now seems archaic, at least in comparison to the generally
accepted contract doctrine of illusory promises.
The willingness to enforce whatever disclaimer happened to be included in
a plan document reached its logical conclusion in Hamilton v. Air Jamaica,
Ltd., in which the court read a disclaimer to mean that the employer had
promised nothing.1 14 If the employer in fact promised nothing, the contract was
110 Id. at 398; see also Ryan v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.
1989) (rejecting challenge to termination of retiree benefits because plan documents
reserved right of termination); Hamilton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350, 1351 (8th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding no contractual duty to refrain from terminating health
insurance absent language to the contrary).
III United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 961 F.2d 1384, 1386
(8th Cir. 1992).112 Id
.
113 Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1944).
114 945 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992). Other courts
have rejected challenges to similar plan provisions that purported to require payment of
benefits only when the company deemed it to be in its best interests. In these cases,
employees challenged their denial of benefits on the ground that the employers' self-
interested decisions breached both contractual obligations to pay benefits under the plan and
fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA to act in the interest of the participants. The courts
found breaches neither of contractual nor of fiduciary duties, reasoning that the contracts
allowed such self-interested provisions. Adams v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 936 F.2d 368
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illusory-there was no contract. 115 The parties' actions over the years bely
such a conclusion.1 16 In Hamilton, Air Jamaica offered its employees various
fringe benefits including severance pay. As part of a corporate reorganization,
Air Jamaica terminated Robert Hamilton, whom it had employed as an account
executive for thirteen years.1 17 Hamilton requested severance pay according to
terms laid out in an employee handbook that Air Jamaica had given him two
months before terminating him. Air Jamaica, however, would only pay
severance benefits substantially lower than those described in the handbook.
Hamilton sued under ERISA, alleging that Air Jamaica breached its promise
under the terms of the handbook.118 Air Jamaica argued that the description of
the benefits provided in the handbook was not binding because the handbook
contained a disclaimer which stated that it "reserve[d] the right, whether in an
individual case or more generally, to alter, reduce or eliminate any pay
practice, policy or benefit, in whole or in part, without notice."1 19
"Read literally," the Third Circuit observed, "the Air Jamaica disclaimer
could be taken to mean that Air Jamaica is under no obligation at any time to
award benefits in accord with its written obligations." 120 To enforce this
disclaimer, the court thought, seemed inconsistent with Congress's intent that
ERISA "provide security in benefits packages." 121 Indeed, enforcement of such
provisions undermines the goal of certainty that the written plan requirement is
supposed to protect. Nevertheless, the court enforced it, saying: "While ERISA
was enacted to provide security in employee benefits, it protects only those
benefits provided in the plan." 122 Since the disclaimer meant that Air Jamaica
effectively promised no benefits, there were no promised benefits for ERISA to
protect.
The essence of the discourse in these cases is as radically formalist a notion
of contract as that which prevailed in the Lochner era. Apparently oblivious to
(8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968 (1992); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911
F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 863 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1988).
115 See infra text accompanying notes 194-95.
116 An economist might think even an illusory promise of benefits is of some value if
the employer ever pays anything based on it. The value would be the face value of the
promise reduced by the percentage chance that the employer will not honor the promise.
But modern contract law would find the employer's promise to be worth so much less than
the employee reasonably believed as to allow the employee some remedy.
117 Hamilton, 945 F.2d at 76.
118 ld.
119 Id.
12 0 Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
121 Id. at 78.
12 2 Id.
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the disparities of bargaining power, to the fact that individual bargaining over
the terms of the employee benefit plan never occurs, and to the long-term
nature of the employment relationship in which expectations might be ill-
defined, constantly evolving, and not represented by any express or written
agreement, courts assert that employees should protect themselves by inserting
language limiting managerial prerogative into the terms of employee benefit
plans. 123 What, one wonders, happened to the core insights of Legal Realism?
As the Realists long ago observed about the freedom of contract doctrine of
Lochner and its progeny, the notion of equality and bargaining between
employer and employee is a fallacy "[t]o everyone acquainted at first hand with
actual industrial conditions." 124 Of course, courts know now, just as courts
knew then, that employers and employees often do not have equal bargaining
power and that bargaining over the terms of employment often does not occur.
The legal equality of the parties and the trope of bargaining serve a legitimating
function for rules designed to serve purposes other than effectuating the intent
of the parties. 125
The application of classical contract doctrine to employee benefits
relationships that bear little resemblance to the usual contract relationship is an
illustration of what Holmes called "the paradox of form and substance in the
development of law." 126 Abstract formulas and categories persist in the law
long after their original rationales cease to make sense. The old forms and rules
"gradually receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the grounds to
which they have been transplanted." 127 The persistence of formalist contract as
123 See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990).
124 Pound, spra note 105, at 454.
125 Legal formalities, both Lon Fuller and Duncan Kennedy have observed, serve the
purpose of providing certainty to transactions at the expense of some arrangements that both
parties thought was a contract. See Fuller, supra note 6; see also Kennedy, supra note 6, at
1688. As Fuller observes, formalities can provide a handy excuse for one party to get out of
what turned out to be a bad deal.
Kennedy claims that the purpose of formalities-including the Statute of Frauds, the
parol evidence rule, and other contract doctrines-is "to force [the contracting parties] to be
self conscious and to express themselves clearly, not to influence the substantive choice
about whether or not to contract, or what to contract for." Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1692.
But when formalities can be consistently invoked by one class of contracting parties at the
expense of another, as is the case with disclaimers in ERISA plans, and because formalities
"operate through the contradiction of private intentions," they are not neutral as between the
parties. Id. at 1691. Formalities with which Congress arguably intended to protect
employees are consistently used by employers to frustrate employee expectations.
126 HOLMdES, supra note 26, at 35.
127 Id. at36.
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the preeminent legal relationship in employment is an example of this
paradox. 128
In both the contract paradigm in employment generally and in the specific
case of employee benefits, the contract paradigm has constricted courts' vision
of the nature of the obligations.1 29 There is historical irony in this, for in the
beginning judges and scholars offered the notion of an enforceable contract
regarding employee benefits as a reform over an earlier and more oppressive
vision of benefits as a gift from employer to employee.
b. Consent, Intent, and the Trope of Bargaining
In this section, I examine the courts' use of the discourse of consent, intent,
and bargaining to describe the employee benefits relationship. I examine the
origins of these concepts in cases interpreting collectively bargained plans, and
trace their migration to cases in which the plan is not the product of bargaining.
At the level of rhetoric or ideology, to equate the content of an insurance
policy or employee benefit trust document with the intent of the employer and
employees is to equate consent to be in an employment relation with knowledge
of and consent to the terms of the employee benefit plan. Through this
equation, the legitimacy of the plan terms is established.
At the same time courts pursue a formalist and positivist approach to
employee benefits promises, they also talk as though they conceived of the
question whether benefits may be terminated as being one of ascertaining the
intent of the parties. The intent, they suggest, is to be determined by looking at
the terms of the health insurance policy or the summary plan description. 130
Many courts refuse to consider any extrinsic evidence of the parties'
understanding on the grounds that ERISA requires plans to be maintained in
128 For a brilliant study of the evolution of contract as a legal concept and as a social
structure in the employment relationship, see PHIaP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND
INDuIALus' c 52-72 (1969).
129 As Robert Gordon observed about contract doctrine:
Mhe law embodies a set of fantasies about the world that become real when people act
upon them as if they are real: when, for example, people accept the terms of a deal
imposed upon them by powerful others as the product of circumstances and their own
volition rather than simply of the power of others ....
Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Soidaity and Power in
Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565, 578.
130 See, e.g., Boyer v. Douglas Components Corp., 986 F.2d 999, 1005 (6th Cir.
1993).
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writing and permits no oral modification of plans. 131 Thus, courts equate the
intent of the parties with the terms of a health insurance policy drafted by the
employer's insurer or the summary plan description drafted by the employer's
lawyers.
The line of reasoning I have just sketched represents an amalgam of two
dominant styles of contract reasoning and reflects in microcosm the historical
evolution of contract law in the nineteenth century. 132 The initial framing of
the inquiry as being about the parties' intent is reminiscent of the early
nineteenth-century "will theory" of contract, in which courts conceived their
task as identifying and giving effect to the subjective intent of the parties. On
this theory, contract is a legitimate form of private ordering because it advances
the freedom and autonomy of the parties. Later in the nineteenth century, the
notion of contract law as effectuating actual subjective intent was supplanted by
what is now known as the "objective" theory of contract, according to which
the actual intent of the parties was, if not irrelevant, at least second in
importance to orderly predictable rules. The emphasis on objective rules
furthered the goals of predictability and stability in commercial transactions.
The same trajectory of historical evolution is seen in the vision of the
"contract" of employee benefits. The rules are legitimated initially on the basis
of consent and subjective intent. But, as that rule structure leads to
unpredictability, the courts transform the structure. The equation of subjective
intent with contract language reflects the ascendance of the objective notion of
contract, in which effectuation of the parties' intent is sacrificed for certainty of
rules, irrelevance of factual questions, and ease of administration.
Courts treat this line of reasoning as totally unremarkable and quite
obvious. In fact, however, it is premised on controversial assumptions about
vesting. I have already questioned the underpinnings of the assumption that
ERISA compels the courts to treat the question of vesting of benefits as a
matter of written contract. 133 Even accepting the legitimacy of that assumption,
however, what does it mean to say that the key to vesting is the intent of the
parties? The search for the putative "intent of the parties" raises three
interrelated concerns. First is the question whether ascertaining the "intent of
the parties" is an intelligible approach to the problem. The parties generally do
not share a common or identifiable "intent"; rather, they have many inchoate
and incongruent expectations. The search for some shared intent is a poor
heuristic device. Instead, courts need to confront explicitly the question of
whose expectations should be honored and why. Second, there are evidentiary
131 See cases cited infra notes 210-11.
132 See generally Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REy. 457
(1897).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 7, 14, 17, 32-34, 45, 51-53, 63-82.
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problems. How is the parties' "intent" to be identified and proven? What
evidence should courts consider on this and why? If the courts limit the inquiry
to plan documents drafted by the employer's lawyers, they will not find that
intent, even if it exists. But if courts significantly broaden the range of evidence
admissible to prove intent, they complicate resolution of disputes. 134 Third,
there are problems of default rules to adopt when, as is often the case if courts
consider all the evidence, there is an evidentiary toss-up as to what the parties
meant by their agreement, or whose expectations to disappoint. Should courts
assume that benefits vest or not? If not, should courts provide any other
remedies?
Under the modem "objective" theory of contractual agreement, the
subjective intent of the parties may be irrelevant; what the courts recognize as
"intent" is what a reasonable person would believe their intent to be under the
circumstances. If that is so, then courts should offer some explanation of why
the plan documents, rather than other manifestations of the parties'
expectations, should be the exclusive source of evidence of the parties'
agreement.
The historical and logical origin of the search for the parties' intent lies in
the rules of interpretation of benefit agreements for the unionized workplace,
where there is a factual basis for asserting that the nature and extent of benefits
is the subject of agreement between the employer and the representative of
employees. The metaphor that I refer to as the trope of bargaining stems from
the assumption that employees belong to unions that can bargain on their
behalf, or that they can bargain individually to protect themselves. In the
nonunion workplace, agreement is largely fictional. An employer offers a
benefit package on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to its employees; there is no
negotiation over the terms. The benefit plan is agreed upon in the sense that an
employee might leave his or her job if he or she feels strongly enough about it.
But it is not obvious that the employee has in fact agreed to specific terms
since, in all likelihood, he or she is unaware of the details. Given that only
twelve percent of the private sector workforce is unionized, the courts'
formalist contract structure is built on assumptions about bargaining that bear
little resemblance to reality.
The origins of ERISA make the existence of these assumptions quite
understandable. Many of ERISA's provisions were derived from the law that
had developed under the Taft-Hartley Act to govern joint employer-union
benefit funds. With respect to Taft-Hartley funds, courts had been called on
repeatedly over the years since the statute was enacted in 1947 to invalidate
terms of such plans on the ground that they were so unfair to employees as to
violate the statute's requirement that trust fund administration not be arbitrary
134 See infra text accompanying notes 188, 259-89.
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and that benefit funds be used solely for the purpose of paying benefits. 135 In
United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, the Supreme
Court put an end to that line of argument, holding that federal courts lacked
authority to review the reasonableness of collective bargaining agreement
provisions allocating health benefits among potential beneficiaries of benefit
trust funds. 136 In Robinson, a group of miners' widows challenged a plan
eligibility rule that was made as part of a package deal to settle a strike.137
Noting the origins of the rule in a collective bargaining compromise, the Court
upheld the rule on the ground that
inevitably financial and actuarial considerations sometimes will provide the
only justification for an eligibility condition that discriminates between
different classes of potential applicants for benefits. As long as such conditions
do not violate federal law or policy, they are entitled to the same respect as any
other provision in a collective bargaining agreement. 138
The basis for the judicial deference in Robinson was plainly the fact that
the plan rule was the product of collective bargaining. Robinson did not address
the question whether courts had authority under section 302(c)(5) to scrutinize
employee benefit eligibility rules that were not the product of negotiations but
135 The specific provision on which this argument rested was § 302(c)(5) of the Labor
Management Relations (raft-Hartley) Act, which provides:
The provisions of this section [prohibiting an employer from paying money to a labor
organization that is a representative of the employer's employees] shall not be
applicable.. with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund
established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees
of such employer, and their families and dependents... Provided, That (A) such
payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or
both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or
hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries
or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the
foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness
insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to
be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and
employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund ....
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a thorough discussion of this strand of
jurisprudence under § 302(c)(5) and case citations, see Central Tool Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists Nat'l Pension Fund, 811 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
136 455 U.S. 562,576 (1982).
137 Id. at 567.
13 8 Id. at 575.
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were instead adopted unilaterally by a plan trustee.139 Although Robinson did
not consider noncollectively bargained plans, since section 302(c)(5) does not
apply to them, at least one court has explicitly adopted the Robinson rationale
for single-employer, noncollectively bargained plans, and others have done so
by implication. In Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for
Salaried Employees, an employee's widow challenged under ERISA a
provision in a single-employer, nonunion pension plan requiring a five-month
waiting period before a participant could be eligible for benefits. 140 The Sixth
Circuit, relying on Robinson, held that "federal courts do not have authority to
review the provisions of such a plan." 141 The court began its reasoning from
the premise that "an employer has no affirmative duty to provide employees
with a pension plan," and that in ERISA, "Congress continued its reliance on
voluntary action by employers by granting substantial tax advantages for the
creation of qualified retirement programs." 142 In response to the widow's
argument that Robinson should not be extended to plans established unilaterally
by an employer, the court found the logic of Robinson persuasive in either
context:
Perhaps the decision to include the waiting period was made due to financial
considerations. Clearly, a company such as Reynolds Aluminum is entitled to
determine without judicial interference the amount of money it desires or can
afford to appropriate for disability benefits. This is especially reasonable in
light of the fact that Reynolds Aluminum Company provides all funding for
the Retirement Program; participants make no contribution. 143
In the court's view, decisions about "which benefits employers must confer
upon their employees... are more appropriately influenced by forces in the
marketplace." 144
The court's observation that Congress made a deliberate choice to rely on
voluntary action by employers to deal with the problem of social insurance is
true, so far as it goes. ERISA clearly does assume that negotiated solutions to
139 See Central Tool Co., 811 F.2d 651.
140 740 F.2d 454, 455 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
141 Id. at 455.
142 Id. at 456.
143 Id. at 456 n.3.
144 Id. at 456; see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp.,
961 F.2d 1384, 1385-86 (8th Cir. 1992); Kyrouae v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11920 (N.D. 111. 1991). In White v. Distributors Ass'n Warehousemen's
Pension Trust, the court held that the Robinson deference to collectively bargained plan
provisions applies to suits brought under ERISA as well as under § 302(c)(5). 751 F.2d
1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1985).
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social insurance issues are preferable to government mandates. But ERISA
does not reflect a deliberate congressional choice that courts abdicate any effort
to devise a set of rules to deal with failures of negotiation or the allocation of
unanticipated losses. As the costs of providing social insurance-especially
health care-have grown, the ability even of unionized employees to negotiate a
mutually acceptable compromise has been tested, and courts have been unable
to devise a reasonable approach to dividing unanticipated losses. Further, as
organized labor has steadily lost ground, the foundation has been eroded from
Congress's assumption that ex ante bargaining and triennial renegotiation of
plan terms would protect employees against the self-interested behavior that
voluntarism otherwise allows. 145
The trope of bargaining has become pervasive in ERISA cases, irrespective
of evidence showing the existence or absence of bargaining. In Moore, for
example, there are all sorts of reasons to think that the five-month waiting
period for a disability benefit plan is not a term of employment that is likely to
be susceptible to market pressure. Similarly, in a case in which an employer
unilaterally amended a severance pay policy to reduce benefits, the Third
Circuit held that the fiduciary duty protections do not apply to an employer's
decision to amend or terminate an employee benefit plan, reasoning that
protection against self-interested employer conduct was unnecessary because
"employees and their unions remain free to bargain for vesting requirements in
the terms of their plans above and beyond those required by statute." 146
Judicial deference to the product of collective bargaining is transmuted into a
notion of deference to the product of an employer's voluntary choices about
who shall be the beneficiaries of its largesse. This deference is what the Moore
court was driving at when it remarked that a company's unreviewable decision
to establish plan rules is "especially reasonable" when the employer provides
the funding and employees do not contribute out of their take-home pay. 147
As the Robinson line of reasoning has spread beyond formulation of
eligibility rules to their modification and application, courts have found
themselves in a quandary. The original justification for deference was that
participants would be protected adequately by the bargaining process in the
formulation and modification of rules and by fiduciary duties in their
application. When rules are created unilaterally by an employer, employees
145 On the effect of the decline of organized labor on the laws regulating nonunion
work relationships, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industnial Pluralim.
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
Bargaining System, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 575 (1992).
146 Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1162 (3d Cir. 1990).
147 Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees, 740
F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
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have tried to persuade courts to substitute fiduciary protections for the
bargaining protections, but have been largely unsuccessful. Particularly when
the line between rule modification and application is fuzzy, as it often is, the
courts' deference leaves employees with no protection. Thus, the only rationale
for deference becomes the one that the Sixth Circuit offered in Moore:
employers can decide to spend their benefit dollars however they want, just as
philanthropists can decide how to allocate their charitable contributions.
c. Contract and Git
The modern rhetoric of employee benefits is suffused with images of
employer largesse. Although courts mainly talk about contract, one can hear
echoes of the laissez-faire statements that statutory wealth redistribution is
coerced charity, as in Adkins, and that deferred compensation is a gift rather
than an obligation, as in McNevin. 148 The gift metaphor emerges most clearly
in the cases addressing whether an employer's decision to amend a benefit plan
is subject to fiduciary duties. In rejecting such claims, courts observe that, if
fiduciary duties were to apply, the decisions "would have to be made solely
with the interests of the covered employees in mind. Under that standard, it is
virtually impossible to see how a decision to terminate or cut back benefits
could pass muster, absent some calamitous circumstance like the imminent
insolvency of the employer." 149 This outcome, as far as the court is concerned,
would undermine Congress's decision not to require vesting of welfare
benefits: "under plaintiffs' reading of ERISA, although nothing in the statute
requires the creation of employee benefit plans in the first place, the fiduciary
duty provisions in effect require that benefits, once created, cannot ordinarily
be narrowed or eliminated by later amendment." 150 Such extensive regulation
would be inconsistent with the court's perceived congressional "concern with
minimizing employers' compliance costs." 151
In rejecting the applicability of fiduciary duties to plan amendments, the
courts reject one possible way to transform the benefits relationship from one
of arm's length self-interestedness into one of fairness and commitment. There
may be a middle ground between the courts' feared scenario in which all
amendments disadvantaging employees would be impossible, on the one hand,
and total laissez-faire, on the other. For instance, employers may have fostered
expectations of continued benefits, and an amendment reducing those benefits
might violate an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Alternatively,
148 See supra text accompanying notes 85-104.
149 Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1159.
150 Id. at 1159-60.
151 Id. at 1160.
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courts might be more skeptical of the distinction between the employer's role as
entrepreneur and its role as fiduciary, and restrict employers' freedom to
occupy both roles simultaneously.
The refusal to apply fiduciary standards to plan amendments rests on the
distinction between the employer's role as entrepreneur when designing or
amending its plan and its role as a fiduciary when administering its plan and
determining claims for benefits. 152 The distinction between the two roles is not
always terribly clear, as Adams v. LTV Steel Mining Co. 153 illustrates. In
Adam, the early retirement plan provided for benefits if the employer
"considers that retirement would... be in its interest ... ."154 The company
determined that it would not be in its interests if a group of otherwise eligible
employees took early retirement, and on that basis denied benefits under the
program.155 The Eighth Circuit rejected the employees' argument that this self-
interested decision, although permitted by the plan documents, violated the
statutory fiduciary duties. "Business decisions can still be made for business
reasons," 15 6 the court remarked, and "[h]ere, LTV made a business decision
that early retirement was not cost effective." 157 Thus, relying entirely on the
plan language, the court allowed the employer to wear its fiduciary and
capitalist hats simultaneously while determining eligibility for benefits, a result
at odds with basic precepts of trust law.
152 See, e.g., Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d
Cir. 1985) (holding that ERISA permits an employer to wear "two hats" and fiduciary
duties apply only when employer wears its plan administrator hat, not its plan sponsor
hat), ceti. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986); see also McGath v. Auto-Body North
Shore, Inc., 7 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1993); Adams v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 936 F.2d
368, 370 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968 (1992); Berger v. Edgewater
Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991);
Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 911 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1020 (1989); Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp.,
724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cei. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984).
153 936 F.2d 368.
154 Id. at 369 (quoting the Ore Mining Companies Pension Plan, the plan at issue in
the case).
155 Id. at 370.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 369 (quoting Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1989)).
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2. The Problem of Long-Tenn Relationships: Conceptualizing the
Employment Relationship as Contract
The failings of the courts' current approach to developing a common law
of contract for employee benefits and ideas for a partial solution may be
understood by reconceptualizing the employment "contract."
In this section, I draw on the sociology of long-term contracts to criticize
the conventional legal understanding of the nature of employment generally and
employee benefits in particular. The archetypal contractual relationship is one
in which two strangers come together at a particular moment in time to
negotiate some form of exchange. It is a discrete transaction where negotiation
over the terms of the exchange occurs before the legal relationship is formed.
The exchange occurs according to agreed-upon terms, and the relationship then
ends. 15s In this model, the contract serves two functions: it organizes the
exchange, and it allocates risk of loss or gain from unforeseen events. 159 The
classical laissez-faire law of contract "presumes a world of independent,
roughly equal actors who achieve their objectives by making determinate
arrangements with predictable outcomes." 160 It also assumes there is social
utility in such transactions and in their enforcement.
Freedom of contract has social value when the parties have the ability to
make choices in their own best interests. Where those assumptions do not hold,
the modem law of contract recognizes mitigating principles. The employment
relationship is one where, in many cases, the freedom of contract assumptions
do not operate. Thus, even under modem contract principles, the courts in
ERISA cases may be subject to critique.
We have long known of the disjunction between the contract doctrine's
implicit assumption of a single, discrete transaction between strangers and the
reality of many relationships governed by that doctrine, in which the parties are
in a long-term continuing relationship.1 61 One firm may regard another as a
valued, long-term customer, and officers of the two firms (unless they are
15 8 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a contract as "a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 1
(1981).
159 P.S. ATIYAH, THE1RiSE AND FALL OFFREEDom OFCoNrRACr 716 (1979).
160 SELZNICK, supra note 128, at 55.
161 See generally Macaulay, supra note 1. Macaulay is one among several scholars
whose view of the sociology of contracts changed the way many think of contract law. The
1985 Wisconsin Law Review symposium, Law, Private Governance and Coninuing
Relationships, provides a good survey of the field and bibliographic footnotes to the
literature. See 1985 Wis. L. REV. 461.
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lawyers, and perhaps even if they are) may believe that there are rights and
obligations that bind them without any of this being spelled out in a contract.' 62
This is the phenomenon of the "relational contract." A relational contract is "a
voluntary agreement for the creation of continuing relationship." 163 The
employment relationship is a paradigmatic example. It is a long-term
relationship, not a discrete transaction. Most of the terms are not negotiated in
advance. Contract "terms" are "renegotiated" as time passes, often without the
parties realizing that "negotiations" are occurring. It is not an ex ante exchange
of explicit or even implicit promises. Nor is it really a unilateral contract in
which a discrete promise or set of promises is exchanged for performance of
identifiable acts. 164 Often the employer is a bureaucratic organization in which
different players may have entirely different understandings of the content of
the agreement between the organization and the employee.
The source of terms or rules for governing the relationship is different in a
relational contract than in a discrete contract. 165 A relational contract "is
voluntary at its inception, but once the act of adherence occurs, the relationship
is governed by preexisting rules or by the authority of the dominant
partner.... The commitments accepted are general and diffuse; they are not
162 See generally id. In particular, see Gordon, supra note 129, at 566-74.
163 SELZNICK, supra note 128, at 54. Selznick actually called it a "status contract"; the
"relational contract" expression is associated with Ian Macneil. See sources cited infra notes
169, 196-212.
164 See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 606 (7th Cir.) (en bane) (citing
1A ARTHURL. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACES § 152, at 13-14 (1963)), ceit. denied, 114
S. Ct. 291 (1993); ef. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L.
REv. 947 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of
the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J 1357 (1983). Nor can the employment
relationship be accurately analogized to a "supply" contract, in which one party (the
employer) agrees to buy the labor output from the employee. What does the employer
purchase? A reasonable amount of labor? What the employee wants to do? What the
employer thinks is necessary? Does the employer also buy the right to control the
employee's work day? The right to control the employee's conduct, such as drug use,
during off hours? Even if the labor market theory answered these questions in the most
general way (which it does not) by saying that the employer buys both the employee's labor
and the right to make rules regarding the extraction of that labor, as a matter of ordinary
contract doctrine the employer would not also be granted the unilateral right to decide
whether the rules so made are consistent with the contract. But the employment at will
doctrine grants the employer just that right. See SELZNICK, supra note 128, at 135.
165 See SELZNICK, supra note 128, at 54. Selznick deployed Weber's distinction
between "status" contracts and "purposive" contracts. See MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SocIETY 100-21 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954).
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premised on explicit consent to particular obligations." 166 Employment viewed
as a relational contract might be an agreement to enter upon a status defined by
law or it might be an agreement to submit to private power. 167 With the
ascendance of the free market in the nineteenth century, the employment
contract became more the latter than the former; the employment contract
became "a device for entering legally unsupervised relations." 168
The employee benefit plan, when viewed as a contract, adds an additional
layer of complexity. It is a relational contract like the employment relation, but
with an added twist: it is more formal, in that the terms are written, and less
subject to individual negotiation or modification. It is the quintessential contract
of adhesion, offered on the same terms to all employees and seldom subject to
modifications for any particular individual. Further, typically neither the person
who conveys the offer nor the person who accepts it knows exactly what the
terms are. 169
166 SELZNICK, supra note 128, at 54; see WEBER, supra note 165, at 105-06. Jay
Feinman has suggested that Macneil's relational contracts approach would call for a court to
decide first whether the contract involved a long-term relationship. If it were a discrete
transaction, the court should enforce the agreement the parties struck when they entered the
deal. If it were a relational contract, however, the court should explicitly consider "norms
of flexibility and contractual solidarity" that are manifest in the parties' actions, as well as
"the community's actions and understanding, the broader society's values, and the legal
system's principles." Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1283, 1303 (1990).
167 SELZMCK, supra note 128, at 123-34. Selznick observes that in Anglo-American
master and servant law, "most of the terms and conditions of employment were implied by
law rather than set by mutual agreement .... Above all, it was not contenplated that the
panies would design their own relationship. As in the case of marriage, the relation might
be entered voluntarily but its character was fixed by law." Id. at 123-24; see also 2
WILLUAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (W.C. Jones ed., 1915).
168 SELzNICK, supra note 128, at 131; see also ORREN, supra note 89.
169 To test the truth of these assertions, I-with this research in mind and being the
very definition of a sophisticated consumer of employee benefits-tried a little experiment.
Before I accepted an offer to join the law faculty of the university where I teach, I inquired
of the dean, who conveyed the faculty's offer, about the terms of the employee benefit plan.
He told me that he did not know the precise terms, but that they were generous and
comparable to the terms of any major university's employee benefit package. Although not
wishing to offend a person whose good opinion of me would be important to my future, I
nevertheless pressed for details. The dean told me that the personnel director would explain
the terms when I began work, and that he did not know further details. He believed he was
answering my questions, and he seemed puzzled that I would persist in focusing on such
picayune matters when I should have been concerned with whether this university is
superior to others that had offered me teaching positions.
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In a relational contract, traditional contract categories of offer, acceptance,
material terms, and the like are of only limited utility for thinking about breach
of obligations, both in terms of identifying obligations and in evaluating
appropriate sanctions for their breach. When it comes to identifying
obligations, the notion of a contract evolving over the course of a long-term
relationship suggests that the parties may understand themselves to be obligated
in ways different than or in addition to those spelled out in their written
contract. As for breach, a core insight of relational contract theory was that
obligations are honored in long-term relations not because of a fear of the legal
consequences of breach but rather out of fear of the harm that nonperformance
will have on the future relationship. This interest in future relations may mean
that there is an implicit agreement to rely only on each other's honor and good
faith, not on legal process, to enforce the contract. Or it may affect what the
parties understand their obligations to be, or what constitutes waiver or
modification. In other words, both rights and remedies under the relational
contract may be either more or less expansive than under the written contract.
In any event, what is clear is that the parties do not regard the written
document as a definitive statement of the proper allocation of responsibilities or
of the risks of loss or gain from unforeseen events in their relationship. And, if
the parties do not so understand it, assuming the task of contract law is to
effectuate the parties' intent, the law should not either. At a minimum, the
What would have happened had I insisted on knowing the terms of the plans and, were
I dissatisfied with any, asked that they be modified for me? Doubtless the dean would have
told me that the law school was powerless to modify the university's health insurance
programs for one employee. Asking for such a contract modification would be as if I, in
purchasing a compact disc player, were to ask the salesperson at the stereo store to waive
the limitations on warranties that are printed on papers packed deep inside the plastic
wrapping inside the box. The person selling the CD player would protest (a) that she did not
know what the warranties were; (b) that she lacked authority to modify them; and (c) that
the company would only sell the CD player on the same terms to all except for price. The
employee benefit contract is thus the typical standardized contract. Frequently both parties,
and virtually always one party, have "little effective choice in the matter at all, and neither
reads nor understands, nor in any real sense agrees to the terms contained in such standard
documents." ATriAH, supra note 159, at 731.
In our complex modem society, we must rely on form contracts drafted by lawyers we
hire to act in our interest. The fact that we are not always aware of every detail in those
forms does not mean the detail is unimportant or that one party might not refuse to enter
into the deal if he or she were aware of some details. But the mere presence of the
provisions in a form contract is not itself a reason to enforce them in every case. Some
other theory is necessary to explain why we should enforce contract terms of which one
party was unaware. There are theories that offer such an explanation, and counter-
arguments as well. None of the theories of which I am aware justifies the treatment of
employee benefits that courts have accorded them.
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parties' understanding of their relationship should be relevant to the law's
definition of the extent of the legally binding obligations under a consent-based
theory of contract. 170 Modem contract law can at least partially account for
this problem under the rubric of the parol evidence rule: if the writings do not
make up a fully "integrated" agreement, the parties are free to offer evidence
that their true agreement was other than what the written documents suggest.
When courts reject parol evidence in ERISA cases, they reject a source of
evidence of what the parties' actual "contract" may have been.
As applied in the employee benefits context, relational contract theory
might suppose that the terms of the plan document are not the definitive
statement of the employer's responsibility for the employee's welfare. John
McGann might actually have had a claim to continued health coverage for his
AIDS treatment. But, as evidenced by the opinions in the Bidlack v.
Wheelabrator decision, that aspect of modem contract law has not found easy
acceptance in the ERISA cases.171 Of course, to the extent that a theory of
contract law is less concerned with effectuating the parties' intent, and more
concerned with establishing a system of easily administered, bright-line rules-
which is a concern in the employee benefits context-liabilities might be more
limited. But that would call for a rationale for decisions that would differ
markedly from the intent-of-the-parties rationale which is most commonly
invoked.
If contract law is about structuring expectations according to some notion
of consent-distinguishing those that are legally enforceable from those that are
not, and allocating risks of loss when unexpected events frustrate
expectations-it cannot help but fail in the employee benefits context. The
failure becomes particularly apparent at a time when economic change
generates many unforeseen events. Economic change has altered employment
relationships profoundly in the last fifteen years, and the increasing cost of
health care has altered expectations regarding employee benefits radically as
well. Employees expect continued health care on reasonable terms. Employers
expect that payroll costs will not exceed some unstated limits. When the costs
of employer-provided health insurance have increased faster than the rate of
inflation for years, someone's expectations are bound to be disappointed. It is
one thing to assume, as does the traditional contracts model, that it is best to
enforce an agreement reached by two entrepreneurs negotiating from positions
of equal strength when the deal turns bad for one side. It is something else to
assume that workers would assume the risk of destitution or that employers
would assume the risk of bankruptcy to pay health care bills. We have reached
170 If the parties do not share the same understanding of their contract, other problems
arise. I examine those problems elsewhere. See infra text accompanying notes 175-205.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 63-76.
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a situation that neither party imagined could occur. It makes no sense to
enforce a contract premised on an entirely different social situation.
C. More Form than Substance: Contract Language and the Problem of
Incongruent and Inchoate Expectations
Having committed themselves to a line of reasoning in which the question
of whether benefits can be terminated is said to be a matter of the parties'
intent, 172 the courts encounter the insoluble problem of reconciling employee
and employer expectations that are both inchoate and incongruent. As I discuss
in this section, the inchoate nature and incongruence of the parties' expectations
render the courts' search for contractual intent futile in many cases. The
absence of contractual intent is the principal difference between employee
benefit plans in the union sector and those in nonunion workplaces. The closest
analogy in the law is the state law of wrongful termination involving employee
handbooks. Not surprisingly, the ERISA cases exhibit much of the same
doctrinal difficulties that the employee handbook cases do, as I will explain.
The scholarly literature and a few courts have recognized the failure of the
conventional view of employment when interpreting employee handbooks, and
I suggest that some of the same insights should be applicable in employee
benefits cases.
The phenomena of incongruent and inchoate expectations explain why
employee benefit plans present fundamentally different issues in the union and
nonunion workplaces. First, when there is collective bargaining, it is
reasonable to assume that the employees, through their union, are aware of the
terms of the plan and have the bargaining power and the institutional structure
to negotiate to protect themselves. In economic terms, the information
problems and the transaction costs associated with challenging adhesion
contracts are reduced. There is, moreover, an institutional framework for
working out differences, through the grievance arbitration process and triennial
negotiations for a new contract. As a consequence, a collectively bargained
contract is a different social artifact than an employee benefit plan that is
172 Boyer v. Douglas Components Corp., 986 F.2d 999, 1005 (6th Cir. 1993) ("To
determine whether the parties have agreed to vest the welfare benefit plan, we apply
principles of federal common law to ascertain the parties' intent. To ascertain the parties'
intent, we first examine the plan documents. The written terms of the plan documents
control and cannot be modified or superceded by the employer's oral undertakings.")
(citations omitted); Gill v. Moco Thermal Indus., Inc., 981 F.2d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1992)
("Essentially, the court must look to the intent of the parties and apply federal common law
of contracts to determine whether welfare plan benefits have vested.").
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drafted unilaterally by the employer's lawyers and insurer.173 In the nonunion
workplace, there is no contract between the employer and the employees
regarding benefits analogous to the collective bargaining agreement. A
collective bargaining agreement and a plan document are very different kinds of
instruments and present different kinds of interpretive problems. The former
actually can be said to represent the parties' shared intent about the terms of
their relationship; the latter cannot. As I have shown, the effort to find actual
intent in the terms of an adhesion contract contorts doctrine. Moreover, the
effort to resolve the voluntarist-entitlement tension by interpretation of plan
language transforms the debate from one about entitlements to one about formal
rules.
In the difficult task of reconciling written terms and inchoate expectations,
the development of the federal common law has followed a trajectory similar to
that of the state common law of wrongful termination in cases involving
employee handbooks. In the beginning, courts apparently thought that making
the manuals contractually binding was a progressive reform that would protect
173 In Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., for example, a case in which retired employees
challenged their former employer's effort to reduce insured health benefits for retirees, the
insurance agreement between the company and the insurer expressly authorized the
company to change the level of benefits; the collective bargaining agreement between the
company and the union did not explicitly address the issue. 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); see supra text accompanying notes 64-76. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that the insurance agreement did not have "much relevance" to
the issue in the case because "[tihe union was not a party to the contract between
Wheelabrator and its insurer, and anyway the issue is not the obligations of [the insurer] to
Wheelabrator but Wheelabrator's obligations to its retired employees. Those obligations are
defined by the collective bargaining agreements, not by the insurance contract." Id. at 606.
In the nonunion context, the formal employee benefit plan serves a function similar to the
insurance contract in Wheelabrator; it is written largely for the purpose of defining the
insurer's risks and liabilities. It is a dual purpose document, in that it also, by virtue of
ERISA, defines the employees' rights under the plan; but the important point is that it is part
of a conversation of sorts between the employer and its insurer.
As the Sixth Circuit summed it up:
Even though a welfare benefit plan is not subject to mandatory vesting
requirements, the parties can agree to vest a welfare benefit plan. To determine whether
the parties have agreed to vest the welfare benefit plan, we apply principles of federal
common law to ascertain the parties' intent.
To ascertain the parties' intent, we first examine the plan documents. The written
terms of the plan documents control and cannot be modified or superceded [sic] by the
employer's oral undertakings.
Boyer, 986 F.2d at 1005 (citations omitted).
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employees. In Woolley v. Hoffinm -La Roche, Inc., for example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in an opinion plainly intended to protect employees,
rejected what it characterized as the majority and outmoded view that refused to
enforce handbook assurances of job security. 174 Yet, it turns out that treating
the manual as a contract is a very limited sort of protection, just as ERISA's
enforcement of plan terms is limited: as long as the employer can draft the
terms, it can write its way around the protections of the law. Since ERISA was
meant to be a repudiation of the failures of state common-law regulation of the
benefits aspect of the employment relationship, the similarity is unfortunate.
The state common-law employee handbook cases are in many ways similar
to employee benefit cases: employers often create an employee handbook that
sets up a dispute resolution procedure and makes explicit or implicit promises
that employees will not be discharged without just cause; obligations evolve
over time and are often inchoate, negotiation does not occur on many terms of
the employment "contract"; and both parties have legitimate expectations that
are not spelled out in any written document. 175 In both situations, employers
make a variety of assurances to employees that give rise to expectations of
future security. Because the assurances are intended to improve employee
morale, employers obviously intend that employees rely on them by remaining
loyal to the company, not forming a union, turning down other job offers,
working harder, and the like. Yet employers presumably do not intend that
every assurance of future security be interpreted as a legally binding promise.
The task for the court is the standard contract law problem of sifting out "mere
puffery" from binding promises. That inquiry can be made through a search
for actual intent or by imposing rules derived elsewhere.
Some courts have seized upon these employee handbooks as evidence of
what the assurances were and have called the handbooks contractually
binding. 176 There is a certain naive positivism in declaring a handbook to
constitute the terms of employment, inasmuch as handbooks are often used
more for internal managerial guidance than for describing or defining the
174 See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (holding
that "absent a clear and prominent disclaimer, an implied promise contained in an
employment manual that an employee will be fired only for cause may be enforceable
against an employer," and discussing contrary authority and commentary), mo&fied, 499
A.2d 515 (NJ. 1985).
175 Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work. Employer Policies and
Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 733, 744.
176 The use of disclaimers in employee manuals is discussed and cases are cited in
Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disdaimer as an Effective Means to Define the
Enployment Relationship, 17 HolsTA L. REV. 365 (1989); and Cynthia W. Scherb, Note,
The Use of Disclaimers to Avoid Employer Liability Under Employee Handbook Provsions,
12 1. CORP. L. 105 (1986).
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[l
parties' expectations of the terms of the employment relationship. These might
be reasons to treat the handbook as some, but not definitive, evidence of the
terms of the relationship. Additionally, employers typically include in
handbooks boilerplate provisions disclaiming any legal obligation that might
arise from the handbook's assurances, attempting to protect themselves from
being held legally accountable for the assurances they have made. Employers
then argue that none of the assurances made in the handbooks are enforceable,
and contend they are not the basis for liability under a theory of promissory
estoppel because the employee cannot reasonably rely on assurances for which
the employer has disclaimed legal responsibility. The employer essentially
claims that legally enforceable obligations cannot arise because its document
says they cannot. 177
Courts perceive the legal significance of employee handbooks as a dilemma
of contract law. The employer wants to use the manual or its policies to induce
desirable employee behavior, to give the appearance of rational management
and workplace due process, yet wants to be free to disregard the manual's
policies and to act arbitrarily when the employer so desires. There may be
cases in which a clear and conspicuous disclaimer should be interpreted to
mean that an employer and an employee have agreed to look only to honor and
good faith, not to law, to enforce the manual's assurances. 178 And there may
be cases in which enforcement of the disclaimer might appropriately be denied
under traditional contract analyses for mistake and unconscionability. But the
majority of cases will not clearly present either situation.
The enforceability of provisions of employee benefit plans presents a
similar dilemma. The employer wants the employee to feel secure in the
knowledge that the employer's health insurance will cover any future illnesses,
and not to feel insecure about the adequacy or generosity of the employer's
benefit plan. But employers also want to control the extent of their future
liabilities. Historically, employers dealt with this problem by leaving the terms
of their plans vague or ambiguous, by not reducing plan promises to writing,
by not providing employees written explanations of plan provisions, or by
including in written plans a right to amend the plan to eliminate benefits
previously or prospectively promised. One of ERISA's reforms, therefore, was
to require that all employee benefit plans be maintained pursuant to a written
document so that employees would be able to determine with precision what
177 See, e.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 972-73 (6th Cir.
1987); Smith v. Neyer, 8 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1607 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Leahy v.
Federal Express Corp., 609 F. Supp. 668, 670-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Fmkin, supra
note 175, at 749.17 8 F'Mkn, supra note 175, at 749.
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their rights were under the plan. 179 By requiring plans to be maintained in
writing, and summaries of the terms to be distributed to employees, ERISA
deals with part of the uncertainty problem. But ERISA does not address two
significant subsidiary problems: what effect to give inconsistent unwritten
promises or assurances, and what effect to give written disclaimers and
reservations of rights to amend plan terms.
In addressing these two problems, courts have resorted to the same
mechanical formalism that has characterized so much of the discussion of the
enforceability of employee manuals and of disclaimers in them. Consider first
the issue of the effect of unwritten promises. The problem has arisen in a
variety of circumstances: an employer promises, orally and in letters and
filmstrips, "lifetime" medical benefits "at no cost" but then later seeks to
terminate or modify the promised benefits as permitted by the terms of the
written plan; 180 an employer offers early retirement with a specific benefit
package to an employee contrary to the terms of the written plan; 181 an
employer maintains a written severance pay plan providing for generous
severance benefits and seeks to pay reduced severance benefits based on an
unwritten modification of the plan. 182 Each of these situations presents issues
of fairness, reliance, and defeated expectations. The courts' most common
response, however, has been to declare unenforceable any assurances made
outside the terms of the formal plan document and the summary plan
description. 183 What the courts have done, in effect, is to create out of the
written plan reform an amalgam of the parol evidence rule and the Statute of
Frauds which applies to all extra-plan promises.
Once a court determines (through whatever evidence is relevant) that a
written contract is intended to represent the entire contract (i.e., is fully
integrated), the parol evidence rule limits the enforceable obligations of a fully
integrated contract to those that are part of the written contract. 184 Specifically,
the parol evidence rule prohibits one party to a written contract from asserting
that prior or contemporaneous oral or written understandings external to the
written contract are part of the contract. Extra-contractual evidence is
admissible, however, for the purpose of determining whether the contract is
179 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
180 Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1988); see also
Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
181 Rizzo v. Caterpillar, Inc., 914 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1990); see also
Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1292 (5th Cir. 1989).
182 Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163 (3d Cir. 1990).
183 See supra notes 63, 112-16; see infra notes 190-91, 209-11.
184 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS 447 (1982); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH
M. PERiLLO, THE LAWOF CONTRACrS 99 (2d ed. 1977).
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integrated, or for interpretation of ambiguous terms. The rule is said to have
the purpose of giving "legal effect to whatever intention the parties may have
had to make their writing at least a final and perhaps also a complete
expression of their agreement."185 It gives the parties certainty about the nature
of the contractual obligations.
The development of the parol evidence rule is conceptually and historically
linked to the "objective" approach to the formation and interpretation of
contracts, in which the contracting parties' actual subjective intent is irrelevant.
The vagaries in the application of the rule reflect a persistent philosophical
tension as to whether contract law is about effectuating the parties' subjective
intent, or whether it is about devising a set of rules about what agreements
reasonably should mean. The objective theory developed, it has been surmised,
for two reasons: one was "a determination to keep factual questions down to a
bare minimum," and the second was to prevent people from denying, when it
was in their self-interest to do so in litigation, that their apparent intent was
their real intent.18 6 Consistent with the objective theory, the parol evidence rule
precludes inquiry into actual historical intent. According to Atiyah, the parol
evidence rule was a response to anxiety that, if parol evidence were admissible,
"'every man's will and intention, however expressed, would be liable to be
defeated, not.., by his own defective expression of that will, but contrary to
his own plainly declared intention.'"' 187
The transformation of the written plan requirement from a rule requiring
employers to take steps to prevent employees from being misled to the current
rule that unwritten promises of benefits are unenforceable represents the same
development in the law that occurred in the nineteenth century: the formalism
of the objective rules of contract formation and interpretation reduces factual
questions (which presumably reduces litigation costs and promotes certainty)
and prevents dishonesty. It reduces the unsavory possibility that substantial
money judgments will turn on the self-serving testimony of employers or
employees.
From the institutional perspective of courts, the exclusion of extrinsic
evidence is an astute move. It vastly simplifies employee benefit cases for
judges. The equation of the plan documents with the parties' intent makes other
evidence irrelevant, and the cases can be disposed of on summary judgment.'88
However, the courts' concern with judicial efficiency is misplaced, for ERISA
185 FARNswoRTH, supra note 184, at 451.
186 AT1YAH, supra note 159, at 459.
187 Id. at 460 (quoting Shore v. Wilson, 8 Eng. Rep. 513 (1842)).
188 See, e.g., Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 986-87 (6th Cir.
1991); Guthrie v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org., 773 F. Supp. 1414, 1417
(D. Colo. 1991); see also infra text accompanying notes 259-89.
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was arguably based on different premises. By granting federal courts the
power-and in many cases exclusive jurisdiction-to protect employees,
Congress subordinated the institutional concerns of federal courts to the needs
of employees. To the extent that courts create rules of limited liability for
reasons of judicial efficiency while portraying them as serving congressional
intent, courts actually thwart that intent.
From the employers' perspective, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence is
highly desirable. By ruling that only written documents are relevant, courts
give employers the ability to control the scope of their liability for benefits.
The employer is free of liability from the assurances made by sympathetic or
misinformed personnel officers, or even from promises made by company
officers whose word would in any other context bind the firm. As the Fourth
Circuit put it, "Courts should hesitate to impose upon companies unwritten
contractual liabilities." 1 89 The courts' hesitance is not without justification.
Uncertainty about liabilities might discourage some employers from
establishing plans (although, as I explain below, whether and the extent to
which this is true is unclear, and it may be that the benefits of greater flexibility
outweigh the costs of uncertainty). 190 Certainty may be important to multi-
employer plans to prevent the plans from becoming obligated to pay benefits
based on promises made by individual contributing employers when the plans'
funding is based on different actuarial assumptions. 191 Certainty can be
desirable for employees to prevent an employer from orally modifying a plan to
make benefits less generous than promised in a summary plan description on
which an employee may have relied. And certainty is also important to the
single employer plan so that the employer may know the extent of its liabilities.
But certainty is not the same thing as absolute employer control. 192 Taken
to its logical conclusion, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence totally vitiates the
189 Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., Inc., 889 F.2d 1346, 1350 (4th Cir. 1989), celt.
denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990).
190 See infra text accompanying note 201.
191 Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986); Aitken v. IP & GCU-Employer Retirement
Fund, 604 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
192 Any employer whose lawyers have the foresight to include a clear and prominent
provision reserving the right to amend or eliminate benefits can control its liability. Courts
have uniformly enforced such provisions. See Boyer v. Douglas Components Corp., 986
F.2d 999, 1005 (6th Cir. 1993); Gill v. Moco Thermal Indus., Inc., 981 F.2d 858, 860 (6th
Cir. 1992); Rizzo v. Caterpillar, Inc., 914 F.2d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir. 1990); Alday v.
Container Corp., 906 F.2d 660, 666 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991);
Sejman, 889 F.2d at 1349-50; Ryan v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598, 603-04 (7th
Cir. 1989); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1989); Musto v.
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notion that courts seek to effectuate the intent of the parties. In fact, it makes it
difficult to call whatever is enforced a contract at all. Recall, for example,
Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., in which Air Jamaica included such a broad
disclaimer in its severance pay plan that it in effect promised to pay benefits
only when it wanted to. 193 Under traditional contracts analysis, Air Jamaica's
promise might qualify as illusory, and, because it has not promised anything,
there is no contract at all. 194 If a contract is illusory, a court can excuse the
party whose promise is not illusory from performance and perhaps order
restitution, 195 but neither of those remedies would help the employee.
Alternatively, a court might exercise limited power to imply obligations to give
substance to the illusory promise. 196 If the obligation implied were one of good
faith, Hamilton might be aided rather little, as Air Jamaica could probably
satisfy most good faith tests. 197 I consider in Part 11(D) below some of the
techniques available under modem contract law to deal with the problem of
disappointed expectations. For the moment, it suffices to note that rather than
pursuing these alternatives, the court endeavored to explain why construing the
promise to be illusory did not offend ERISA's protective purposes.
The court began by asserting that since "ERISA does not require Air
Jamaica to provide its employees with a benefits plan, nor does ERISA require
that Air Jamaica provide any particular set of benefits, if it decides to establish
a welfare benefits plan," Air Jamaica could offer benefits on whatever terms it
American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020
(1989); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988).
193 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992); see supra
text accompanying notes 113-22.
194 FARNSWORTH, supra note 184, at 72-82.
195 Id. at 98-104.
196 Id. at 74-78. For example, in Anthuis v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., which
involved a severance plan that reserved total discretion to the employer to decide whether to
award benefits, the court implied an obligation to make a case-by-case determination; on
that basis, the court invalidated a blanket denial of benefits. 971 F.2d 999, 1008 (3d Cir.
1992). Referring to Hamilton, the court held that reservations of complete discretion are
permissible, but that no discretion was actually exercised in the plaintiff's case because he
had been denied benefits along with a whole group of employees solely because he had
accepted another kind of bonus payment from the firm. Id. The dissent perhaps justly
criticized the majority for failing to explain how a blanket denial of benefits to a group
failed to constitute an exercise of discretion and for failing to offer guidance as to what sort
of case-specific determination would suffice. Id. at 1014-15 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, the majority was struggling to impose some sort of limit on the employer's
discretion, given the broad rule of Harilton.
197 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 184, at 75.
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chose.198 This conclusion is anomalous under contemporary contracts
reasoning, for freedom to contract is not usually taken as a rationale for not
policing the fairness of bargains at all. Moreover, in response to Hamilton's
argument that this interpretation of ERISA would "render the protections of
ERISA illusory," the court reasoned that the only protection ERISA offers is
requiring employers to state in writing exactly what the benefits offered were,
including the existence of a disclaimer.1 99 The disclaimer, according to the
court, put Air Jamaica's employees "on notice that they [had] no guaranteed
benefits," and thus they could "bargain further or seek other employment if
they are dissatisfied with their benefits." 2°°
The court in Hamilton sought to explain not only why enforcing a
boilerplate disclaimer of promises is not prohibited by ERISA, but why it
actually "furthers the interest of employees":
Employers are understandably more willing to provide employee benefits
when they can reserve the right to decrease or eliminate those benefits. To the
extent that employees have sufficient bargaining power to obtain guaranteed
benefits, ERISA will enforce those rights and will ensure-through its
disclosure requirements-that employees know what benefits they will receive.
Therefore, allowing employer reservations of the right to make individual
benefit determinations takes nothing away from employees who can command
guaranteed benefits and will allow other employees to obtain benefits the
employer would refuse to provide on a guaranteed basis. 201
It is not clear whether enforcing disclaimers in fact makes employers more
willing to provide benefits or, more likely, simply more willing to promise
them. At worst, enforcing such disclaimers encourages employers to deceive
employees about the real (and paltry) nature of their benefit plans. Although the
Hamilton court assumed the employee was aware of the limits on the benefits
because the disclaimer was written in the manual, the employee in fact claimed
not to know of the disclaimer. To say that he is bound by the disclaimer
because the disclosure means that the plan somehow reflects his intent is pure
fiction.202 The fiction skews the court's perception about the feasible ways that
198 Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 79.
202 Stewart Macaulay was among the first to theorize about the challenges that form
contracts present for traditional contract doctrine:
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employees can protect their interests in the relationship. The court assumes that
an employee is capable of bargaining for greater protection. This is plainly not
true. Robert Hamilton, we may assume, had no idea that Air Jamaica's benefit
plan was so evanescent. Bargaining only works if the parties know cc ante the
terms of the arrangement. Since ERISA's disclosure obligations are not
triggered until a person becomes an employee participant, the statute does not
facilitate bargaining a ante. Now that he knows, of course, it is too late.
Relational sanctions might have some effect within the ongoing relationship
because the employer might fear the morale problems that amending a plan or
denying benefits might generate. In the severance pay context such as
Hamilton's, however, the relationship has terminated and the employer has
nothing to fear, except from current employees who may fear the same
treatment. Additionally, as noted above, the group nature of employee benefit
plans makes individual bargaining less feasible.
The employee, the court might say, has entered into a relationship with the
employer in which the employer has the right to dictate the terms on which
benefits shall be offered. The Third Circuit presumes consent to the terms of
the plan by inference from consent to be in the employment relationship. 2°3 On
this analysis, however, the legitimacy of onerous benefit plan terms must be
identified by a different method, which the court does not do.
In sum, the difficulty with the courts' formalist approach to welfare
benefits is that a promise such as Air Jamaica's-"We'll pay benefits when, if,
and in whatever amount we choose"-cannot be said to reflect Hamilton's
For example, a company that manufactures paper uses a purchase order form printed
on gray paper. On the back are a number of terms and conditions printed in such light
gray ink that they can be seen only by holding the paper at an angle to the light.
Clearly, if a court were ever to enforce any of these terms and conditions, it would be
marching to some other ideology than "choice," even "choice" in one of its mor
extreme definitions. More difficult are the cases where the words are there in a form
more easily read and understood but where the probabilities are very great that only the
most suspicious will discover and translate them correctly. This is often true of printed
form "contracts" and procedures for using them which are produced by large
corporations to govern what to them are routine transactions. As we know, often these
organizations attempt to use contract ideology to legislate privately; sometimes
successfully, sometimes not. How then should we decide that one does or does not have
a duty to read and understand?
Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
203 See Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OsGOODE HALL
L. 5, 20-21 (1984).
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intent in any meaningful sense. Not only is the equation of plan language with
actual, subjective, historical intent fictional, it is a particularly "deadening" sort
of fiction.204 The parties' relationship and their lives together are flattened into
words on a page and the words dominate them. The diffuse nature of the
parties' expectations and sense of obligation are collapsed into a few discrete
and tightly bonded rights set out in the language of the plan instruments. One
suspects that everyone-the employer, the employee, and the judge-must at
least vaguely wonder why it is that the complexity of the relationship and the
many different expectations cannot be reflected in the law. These cases have a
peculiar fairy-tale quality in which judges are compelled, as if in a trance, to
allow employers to deprive employees of basic human needs. No one is
responsible, and although the outcome makes no sense, nothing can be done
about it. "[lit is the contract that governs, that 'does' everything, that absorbs
all responsibility and deflects all other recourse." 205
D. Alternative Discourses
There are, in some of the cases, traces of alternative discourses in which
courts directly confront the substantive issues of entitlements and assume
responsibility for designing rules to address the countervailing concerns. In
these discourses, the debate shifts from formalist to functional or substantive
regulatory terms. There are at least four well-developed ameliorative state
common-law doctrines that occasionally surface in ERISA cases and that
should be given closer scrutiny by courts.
First, there is the well-known principle of contract interpretation under
which a contract, especially a form contract, is construed against the party that
drafted it.2°6 This interpretive rule is sensitive to the problem of interpreting
language of a legal instrument that is dictated by one party. It was widely used
in pre-ERISA pension cases under state law.207 Since ERISA was enacted,
however, courts only very occasionally have employed such a rule in
construing employee benefit plan terms, and some have explicitly rejected the
204 PATRICA I. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTs: DIARY OF A LAw
PROFESSOR 224 (1991).
205 Id.
2 06 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CONTRACrS § 206 (1981).
2 07 Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 121 n.4 (4th Cir. 1971); Ehrle v.
Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp., 530 S.W.2d 482, 492 (Mo. App. 1975); see also Hurd v.
Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630, 655 (D.NJ. 1976); Miller v. Dictaphone, 334 F. Supp. 840,
842 (D. Ore. 1971).
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rule's application in the ERISA context. 208 By and large, courts seldom even
address the question whether such a rule should be applicable. Perhaps the rule
is alien to ERISA cases because parties seldom invoke it, but more likely its
absence is because it is not applied to collective bargaining agreements, for
there are separate rules of interpretation to advance the policies of fairness
where a contract is actually negotiated. But interpretation of benefit agreements
outside the union context is the classic situation calling for such a rule of
interpretation: the document is drafted unilaterally by one party with far greater
sophistication than the other, and the terms of the agreement are not negotiated.
Such a rule of interpretation may not be necessary in every case. Where the
court is reviewing a benefit plan administrator's interpretation of a plan in the
context of reviewing a denial of benefits, the fiduciary principles may
adequately guard against enforcement of unfair plan terms. But where the court
interprets a plan term de novo, as where it considers an employer's actions in
its entrepreneurial capacity in amending a plan, the principle of interpreting a
contract against the drafter should be applicable.
A second strand of alternative discourse is found in the cases in which
courts interpret the provision of ERISA that requires that plans be maintained
in writing.2 9 In the majority of these cases, courts read ERISA's written
document requirement as meaning that oral evidence of employee benefit
promises is not part of the "plan" and that oral promises are therefore
unenforceable as plan terms.210 Courts regard oral or written promises that are
208 Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984). In Taylor v.
Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, the court explicitly rejected the
contention that ambiguous plan terms should be construed against the drafter on the ground
that the plan is more like an employment contract than like an insurance contract. 933 F.2d
1227, 1233 (3d Cir. 1991); accord Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1238 (1991). But see Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1012 (1990).
209 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
2 10 ERISA § 402(a)(1) requires that "[elvery employee benefit plan shall be established
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988). Some
courts have interpreted this provision to preclude oral or informal amendments to plans, and
thus to deny recovery on estoppel theories. Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d
653, 659 (8th Cir. 1992); Awbrey v. Pennzoil Co., 961 F.2d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 1992)
(extrinsic evidence of meaning of plan terms is inadmissible); Confer v. Custom
Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1991); Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d
74, 77 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163 (3d Cir. 1990); Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d
1262, 1264-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960-61 (11th Cir.
1986); Rosile v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 862, 871 (D. Kan. 1991), af'd, 972
F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1992). Occasionally the refusal to entertain extrinsic evidence benefits
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not in accord with formal plan documents as putative amendments to a plan and
therefore invalid because they are not made in accordance with plan procedures
for amending the plan.211 Whatever the actual understandings of the parties
may have been, ERISA is read to make unenforceable any obligation with
respect to benefits that is not part of the formal plan documents.
Some courts, however, treat the enforceability of extra-plan promises as
raising claims of equitable estoppel. 212 Under the ordinary rule of equitable
estoppel, a party who makes a misleading representation of a material fact to
another, with the intent that the other rely on it, is estopped to deny liability
when the other reasonably relies to her detriment on that representation. 213 The
courts that decline to apply equitable estoppel in ERISA amendment cases do
so on the ground that:
Congress's purpose in requiring that benefit plans be in writing can only be
served if the plan is enforced as written. When a party is estopped from
asserting a right in a written plan, the plan as enforced is not the same as the
employees, as when the employer seeks to show less generous plan terms than appear on
the face of the plan. See Bellino v. Schlumberger Technologies, Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 32 (1st
Cir. 1991).
Other courts, however, will enforce unwritten benefit promises on theories of equitable
estoppel. Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298-1300 (6th Cir. 1991); Black
v. TIC Investment Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990); Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits,
Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1217 (6th Cir.) (decided under the LMRA), cen. denied, 484 U.S.
820 (1987); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986);
Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1355 (8th Cir. 1980); Coonce v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 759, 771 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
211 See, e.g., Confer, 952 F.2d at 43.
2 12 National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.
1991) (allowing recovery on equitable estoppel theory); Rosen v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Union Local 274, 637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.) (allowing estoppel under
pre-ERISA law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981); Alday v. Container Corp., 906 F.2d
660 (11th Cir. 1990) (no estoppel), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991); Cleary v. Graphic
Communications Int'l Union Supplemental Retirement and Disability Fund, 841 F.2d 444
(1st Cir. 1988) (no estoppel); Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 772 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (no equitable estoppel against multi-employer plan), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1012 (1986); Chesser v. Babcock & Wilcox, 753 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (no
estoppel); Haeberle v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo Carpenters Healthcare, Dental, Pension
and Supplemental Funds, 624 F.2d 1132, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1980) (no estoppel).
213 Amigead, 944 F.2d at 1298; Black, 900 F.2d at 115.
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plan as written. For this reason, ERISA would seem to preclude application of
equitable estoppel to disputes over benefit plans under the statute.2 14
In allowing plaintiffs to recover based on an estoppel arising from extra-plan
assurances, courts have emphasized that the writing requirement is principally
to protect employee expectations, and to protect the actuarial soundness of
funded plans. Where equitable estoppel would protect employee expectations
and where, because the plan is a single-employer plan, liability by estoppel
would not deplete a fund on which several employers rely, courts properly
have allowed estoppel.215
Allowing employees to recover on an equitable estoppel theory is not,
however, a complete solution to the problem of devising fair rules for honoring
incongruent expectations. It is more difficult to establish liability under an
equitable estoppel theory than it is to establish the enforceability of a promise
on a contract theory because of the need to prove intent, misrepresentation, and
reliance. Thus, if extra-plan promises are enforceable only under an estoppel
theory, the liability of the employer or plan is more limited than under a
contract theory.
Two other possible traditional common-law solutions to the problem of
defeated expectations are the doctrines of promissory estoppel and unjust
enrichment. Although plaintiffs invoked these doctrines relatively often (with
only mixed success) before ERISA, these are the common-law doctrines least
often seen in the reported decisions since. 216 Promissory estoppel allows
enforcement of promises based on evidence of reliance by the promisee; unjust
enrichment allows enforcement of promises when the promisee has conferred
some benefit on the promisor.217 The unavailability of these common-law
remedies under ERISA in many cases leaves plaintiffs with fewer protections
than were available before ERISA was enacted,218 an anomalous result under a
2 14 Annitead, 944 F.2d at 1300 (summarizing Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956
(11th Cir. 1986)).2 15 Id. at 1300; Black, 900 F.2d at 115. See generally BRUCE, supra note 43, at 411-
17.
216 Kolentus v. AVCO Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding neither
promissory estoppel nor unjust enrichment applicable), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987);
Hurd v. Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630, 656-57 (D.N.J. 1976) (applying promissory estoppel);
Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175, 1181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no unjust
enrichment); Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 344-47 (D. Minn. 1967) (finding
unjust enrichment).
2 17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CONTRACrs § 90 (1981); FARNSWORTH, apra
note 184, at 92-96.
2 18 See Olson v. General Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1992). One
particular anomaly is that promissory estoppel is available against plans when the plaintiff is
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statute designed to improve upon pre-existing common-law regulation of
employee benefits.
Promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, broadly applied, could be quite
subversive of an employer's power to control its employee benefit obligations,
and this possibility obviously troubled the pre-ERISA courts that considered
these theories. Ultimately, however, the state courts perhaps might have
worked out an accommodation between the need to protect employees, on the
one hand, and the potential to create vast and unforeseeable liabilities for
employers on the other. The difficulties in applying unjust enrichment were just
beginning to be worked out in the courts at the time ERISA was enacted. In a
widely cited case, a court allowed employees whose termination in a corporate
restructuring prevented them from attaining vested pension rights to assert an
unjust enrichment theory that would allow them to recover the partial value of
their pensions.2 19 The argument was that the employer's actions prevented him
from satisfying all requisites of pension eligibility, and that the employer
should not reap the benefits of the employees' long service in anticipation of a
pension and recoup the assets of the pension fund that would otherwise have
gone to pay the terminated employees' pensions. A later case recognized the
dangers (from the employer's perspective) of wide availability of an unjust
enrichment theory: every employee terminated before attaining a vested pension
could seek a recovery of the value of his service that would have been
compensated by the pension.220 Yet the court also recognized that in some
cases such a recovery should be available, so the court suggested that the
theory be available when there was no bargaining over the terms of the plan
and no reason to believe that the parties themselves allocated the risk that
someone other than an employee or plan participant. For example, in a case in which an
employee health plan assured a participant and his health care provider that a treatment was
covered by the plan, and in reliance the participant sought the treatment, the plan later
denied coverage and sought to rely on the written terms of the plan to defeat the claim. The
health care provider sued the plan on a promissory estoppel theory. This is the classic case
of promissory estoppel: an assurance reasonably expected to induce action in reliance, and
action in reliance where it would be unjust to allow the promisor to renege. The Tenth
Circuit rejected the plan's argument that ERISA preempted the promissory estoppel claim
and allowed the provider to assert the claim, but strongly suggested that if it were the
employee who were asserting the claim, it would be preempted and ERISA would provide
no remedy. Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins., 944 F.2d 752, 754-55
(10th Cir. 1991). In particular, the court said that although "preemption normally is not
dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies," because the plaintiff "is not a
participant or a beneficiary... its lack of alternate remedies in the event of preemption is
deserving of consideration." Id. at 755.2 19 Luca, 277 F. Supp. at 345.
220 Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 684 (5th Cir. 1975).
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termination would prevent the employees attaining the benefit of the pension
bargain.221
The process of creating and adjusting ameliorative rules for the
enforcement of employee benefit agreements was in full swing in the state
courts at the time ERISA was enacted. The federal courts, being perhaps less
familiar with these common-law doctrines and the common-law approach to
cases, have begun to do some of the same work, but have not yet come close to
the point that state courts had reached at the time ERISA abruptly halted the
process.
IV. THE ROMANCE OF CONTRACT
I began with Grant Gilmore's notion that the narrow scope of social
obligation implicit in nineteenth-century contract theory expanded over the
course of the twentieth century to the point that contract's hallmark consent-
based theory of duty was supplanted by a broad range of societally imposed
obligations. Or, to put it in Gilmore's oft-quoted terms, contract merged with
tort to form "Contort." 222 In his view, the law of contract experienced an
"erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth century theory of contractual
obligation," and expansion of "the range and the quantum of obligation and
liability," to the point of a "socialization of our theory of contract." 223 I have
suggested that the nineteenth-century version of contract is not dead yet, but is
alive and well in ERISA cases. I now consider this question: what accounts for
the resort to classical contract discourse in interpreting a statute that was meant
to be at least a partial repudiation of some of the assumptions underlying such a
discourse? Why are we still puzzled by the phenomenon that Roscoe Pound
complained about nearly ninety years ago: namely, that "the legal conception
of the relation of employer and employee [is] so at variance with the common
knowledge of mankind?" 224
In the previous part, I explored the explanations courts have offered for
their choice of the free contract paradigm. In this part, I offer three interrelated,
unspoken explanations for the persistence of contract. There is an explanation
of external ideology that I call the appeal of voluntarism, one of internal legal
ideology that I call the appeal of formalism, and one of institutional constraints
that I call the problem of bounded obligations and federal common law. The
three are not alternatives to one another: rather, each explains some aspects of
the phenomenon, and the three work together, reinforcing certain unarticulated
221 Id. at 685.
222 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 90.
223 KEssLER& GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1118.
224 pound, supra note 105, at 454.
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assumptions. As explanations, none of the three is entirely persuasive on its
own; in combination, they offer a bit more.
The first phenomenon is straightforward: the ideology of voluntarism
pervades the legal consciousness about the nature of the employment
relationship and the limits on employers' responsibility for the welfare of their
employees. The second is more subtle. Contract strikes judges as an appealing
framework both because it is a conceptual habit learned in law school and
because it offers apparently neutral, noncoercive, and legitimate rules for
resolving conflicting moral claims. Contract allows judges to avoid, to
renounce, and to obscure their responsibility for making difficult value choices
with little statutory guidance. The third explanation focuses on the respects in
which contract doctrine responds to institutional strains that Congress placed on
the federal courts when it federalized the law of employee benefits without
providing either specific substantive guidance for making difficult value choices
or an agency to work out such choices in the first instance. The federal courts'
choice of contract discourse reflects an understandable institutional reluctance
to create a set of broad common-law rights that would necessarily be difficult to
define and to administer.
A. The Appeal of Voluntarism
The easiest and most obvious explanation of the resurgence of laissez-faire
era contract analysis in employee benefit cases, and an explanation that has no
little force, is the ideological orientation of the law and, more specifically, the
federal judiciary. The ideological orientation of a legal system can be assessed
at different levels of sophistication and nuance. At the most unvarnished and
simplistic extreme, one could note that many of the decisions were written by
politically conservative or law-and-economics-minded judges. For instance,
Judge Kennedy, a Carter appointee on the Sixth Circuit, and Judge Nelson, a
liberal on the Ninth Circuit, wrote opinions in Yard-Man and in Bower v.
Bunker Hill, respectively, that imposed greater obligations on employers to
provide retiree health benefits than Judges Posner and Easterbrook,
conservative Reagan appointees on the Seventh Circuit, were willing to allow
in their opinions in Bidlack, or than Judge Manion, another conservative on the
Seventh Circuit, allowed in Ryan v. Chromalloy.225 Or, to take an example
from another area of employment law, a liberal California Court of Appeal
225 Conyae United Automobile Workers v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984) and Bower v. Bunker Hll, 725 F.2d 1221 (9th
Cir. 1984) uith Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 618 (7th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993) and Ryan v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1989).
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justice and a noted labor law scholar, Joseph Grodin, wrote a seminal opinion
creating implied contract protections against unjust dismissal, and the
California Supreme Court under the stewardship of the liberal Chief Justice
Rose Bird further expanded common-law protections against unjust dismissal;
later, under the conservative Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas, the California high
court narrowed those protections. 226
The appeal of voluntarism is far more complex than simply the judges'
personal politics. Laissez-faire opinions have been written by judges who are
neither politically nor judicially especially conservative. 227 Liberal and
moderate judges concurred in many more such opinions.228 The appeal of the
ideology of voluntarism must be more than simply a judicial sympathy for
capital at the expense of labor.229 Voluntarism is more deeply ingrained and
holds a more pervasive grasp on American law than simply in labor and
employment cases. 230
By the time that courts came to interpret ERISA, they had firmly in their
minds an image of labor law as being limited in its goals and orientation. The
voluntarist ideology that the employment relationship should be shaped largely
by private negotiation, with only minimal governmental direction, mediation,
226 Clomare Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App. 1981);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (opinion of Bird, CJ.,
concurring and dissenting) with Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
227 E.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990) (fudge
Becker).
228 For instance, Judge Higginbotham joined in Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992); District Judge Pollak, sitting
by designation, joined in Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay
Plan, 933 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1991); and Judge Godbold joined in Owens v. Storehouse,
Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993), all of which allowed employers summarily to cut off
benefits to employees.
229 That judicial consciousness about legal protections for workers cannot be attributed
simply to the judges' political affiliation or persuasions was demonstrated systematically in
Title VII cases by Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson in Race, Gender, Work, and Choice:
An Enpiical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in itle VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 1073, 1167-80 (1992). My suggestion that there is at most
a correlation in ERISA cases is based simply on anecdotal evidence, and might have to be
revised if one were to do a thorough study.
230 Recently, it has been argued that "contract images and ideology exert a strong hold
on the legal imaginations of the Justices" of the Supreme Court. G. Richard Shell, Contracts
in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 433, 436 (1993). Shell traces the
phenomenon of a federal common law of laissez-faire contract through many recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, characterizing it as a "well-integrated, even radical, aspect
of its pro-market jurisprudence." Id.
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and allocation of obligations, had become the paradigm of federal labor law.
Whatever potential for radical redistribution of power and wealth that existed in
the federal labor legislation initially-a question as to which I am agnostic-by
the early 1970s most judges regarded labor law as being about mediating
interest group power.23 1 More generally, the creation of the private welfare
state in the 1940s marked the eclipse of the social democratic and
redistributivist vision of labor law and labor politics.23 2 Long before ERISA
was enacted, the labor movement had given up serious effort to persuade
policymakers to intervene in any substantial or systematic way in capital and
labor markets. The voluntarist assumption underlying the courts' interpretation
of ERISA is the same as that underlying their approach to the NLRA and to
state common-law protections for individual employees: labor and management
have equal power in the workplace and the law should enforce their formal
contracts (but not their informal understandings) and should restrain really
extreme abuses of power. Just as courts often resort to the need for managerial
flexibility and the rights of property to derive a legal entitlement to managerial
prerogative in labor cases (such as the right to replace striking workers, 23 3 the
right to close plants without union involvement,23 4 or the right to restrict
employee access to union organizers23 5), so too do they invoke the same
managerial preogatives in ERISA cases.
The contemporary appeal of voluntarism in labor cases is at least in part
attributable to the modem penchant for analyzing legal issues from the premises
of classical economics, although voluntarism's appeal is more profound than
that. Law and economics thinking has become pervasive among the legal
intelligentsia. Judges often assume, without evidence, that efforts to regulate
working conditions tend to result in a reduction of wages or other collateral
harms to workers. 236 Thus, courts have justified rejecting the possibility that
ERISA should be interpreted to require the vesting of health benefits because
granting employees greater entitlements to benefits would cause employers to
231 See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American
Labor Law, 90 YALE LJ. 1509 (1981); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Ofigins of Modern Legal Couness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L.
Rav. 265 (1978).
232 See Lichtenstein, supra note 39; Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at xiii (Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser eds.,
1989).
233 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
234 First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
235 Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
236 See supra text accompanying notes 103, 143-47, 151.
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refuse to offer such benefits at all.237 This scenario may be true in some cases;
it may not be in others. The point is, judges offer it as a reason for a cramped
interpretation of ERISA without any evidence of the actual economic effects of
a particular regulatory model.
Voluntarism has influenced the image of the employment relationship more
generally. The notion that employees can bargain with their employers for the
protections that the court declines to enforce as a matter of statutory right238 is
premised on a vision of an employee and employer haggling over terms of
employment or terms of a benefit plan in a way that realistically seldom
happens. The judicial imagination has been captured by the vision of the labor
market as a daily auction in which each side can walk away to a higher (or
lower) bidder if the other will not meet certain terms. While some labor
economists have criticized the auction model, noting that in many firms the
labor market is largely internal to the organization because both sides rely on
the employee's fim-specific knowledge, the vision of the employee and the
employer meeting de novo in the marketplace remains prevalent.2 9 There may
be some employment relationships that the labor auction model accurately
describes, and those employees may indeed be better off under the laissez-faire
contract rule than they would be if the courts imposed more expansive
liabilities on employers. For most employees however, a market governed
solely by laissez-fake legal rules will not produce an optimal amount of reliable
social insurance. The laissez-faire contract model reflects a contested and at
best partial vision of employment relationships, not a universal truth.
A related ideological explanation for the contract discourse comes from the
prevailing culture of employee benefits. Outside the realm of Taft-Hartley
plans, the culture of private pension plans had long been one in which the
altruistic motives for establishing such plans were overshadowed by the
employers' self-interest in maintaining control over the workforce. As the first
historian of pension plans remarked in 1932, in private pension plans "the
relief aspects have tended to decline in importance though perhaps never to
disappear entirely, and economic motives have come more to the fore." 240
The voluntarist framework of ERISA provided ample encouragement to
these views and little reason to question them. The same images of managerial
prerogative and the need for capital mobility that color the courts' view of the
NLRA241 and common-law protections for individual workers, 242 are reflected
237 See supra notes 143, 151, 201, and infra notes 257-58.
238 Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990).
239 The literature on internal labor markets is discussed in Finkin, supra note 175, at
734,742, 751.240 LATMER, supra note 101, at 18.
241 E.g., cases cited supra notes 233-35.
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in the voluntarist face of ERISA and are magnified through the prism of
judicial interpretation. It takes an external crisis, such as the unanticipated
increase of health care costs, to reveal to courts, and to the rest of us, just how
much unrestrained power the employer has over the terms of employment and
how vulnerable the employee is. The contract paradigm and the deference to
private decisionmaking obscures these exercises of power from view in the vast
majority of cases. 243 What is not seen cannot challenge the dominant way of
seeing, and the dominant way of seeing keeps things from being seen.
B. The Appeal of Formalism
The preceding explanation for the continuing appeal of classical contract
doctrine is not entirely satisfying. Even a thoroughgoing commitment to
voluntarism does not compel reluctance to allow use of extrinsic evidence to
prove contractual liabilities, unwillingness to interpret contracts against the
drafter, or skepticism about the use of promissory or equitable estoppel as
theories of liability. While voluntarist ideology might account for some of the
discourse about bargaining and concern about limiting unanticipated employer
liability, it does not account for the formalist rhetoric. The explanation for
formalism lies, I think, in the reasoning and the nature of the issues themselves.
While I am not prepared to launch a headlong assault on the task of explaining
the appeal of formalism in legal doctrine, and I recognize the difficulty of
inferring from the rhetoric of judicial opinions the actual motives of the judges
themselves, 244 nevertheless, it is worth speculating briefly on what the
discourse reveals.
The dominant image in much of the common law of labor and employment
law has changed little over the course of the twentieth century: employees can
and will bargain to protect themselves, and therefore, the common law need not
treat them differently than participants in any commercial transaction. The
prevalence of this image in the early decades of this century may be attributed
to the legal training of the judiciary, their social class, and their politics, all
2 42 See generally WILLIAM 1. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATIO: RIGHTS AND REmDms (2d ed. 1993).
2 43 One image of social insurance that was seldom challenged until feminists gained
political voice in the late 1970s was the gender bias of a regime that provided social
insurance only through participation in the paid labor force. See generally Mary Jo Bane,
Politics and Policies f the Feninization of Poverty, in THE POLITcs OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNrrmD STATES ch. 11 (Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff & Theda Skocpol eds.,
1988).
2 44 See generally RiCHARD A. WASSmSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1961)
(exploring the difference between discovery and justification in judicial reasoning).
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
without impugning their good faith. Those explanations are less persuasive now
that all of us-including judges-are supposed to be legal realists. 245
Notwithstanding the trenchant criticisms of Legal Realism, Critical Legal
Studies, and Critical Race Theory, law school trains all of us to be formalists,
at least in our views of the nature of judicial decisionmaking. We may reject
formalist approaches to problems in many circumstances, but the concepts are
there when we need them. This is both the genius and the irrationality of the
common law, Holmes's paradox of form and substance in the development of
law, to which I have previously alluded:246
[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier
creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long
after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been
forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion
from the merely logical point of view.247
The abstract formulas persist, but their content changes as the law adapts to
social change. Thus, if we learn in law school that an enforceable contractual
obligation consists of offer, acceptance, and consideration, and that the terms of
the deal must be identified only by scrutiny of the offer and, perhaps, the
acceptance, we will tend to apply that framework to any private consensual
relationship. We see a relationship, we call it a contract, and all else seems to
flow inevitably and naturally from that initial characterization, whether or not it
makes any sense. In short, doctrinal rules serve a legitimating function and an
orienting function, even though their logic is lost in the past.248
One circumstance in which the formalist tools come in handy is when
judges are presented with irreconcilable claims or expectations, with strong
moral claims on both sides. Formalist discourse allows judges to absolve
themselves of responsibility for the difficult value choices they make, without
even acknowledging that they are making such difficult choices. Confronted by
the claim of an employee dying of AIDS without health insurance, the judge
can say to herself: "I didn't consign him to his dismal fate; the law made me do
it." This rhetorical gambit is not uncommon among judges confronted with
wrenching choices. One reason for this phenomenon was suggested by the late
Robert Cover in his study of fugitive slave cases in the antebellum era; judicial
acquiescence to an unjust law
2 45 WRLLIm TWINIG, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEmENT 382 (1985
reprint) (1973) ("Realism is dead; we are all realists now."); see also William Twining,
Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 329 (1985).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27, 126-27.
2 47 HOLMES, supra note 26, at 35.
2 48 See SELZNmcK, supra note 128, at 53.
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was the result neither of a failure to appreciate the creative input of the
judiciary, nor of a failure to understand the limitless bounds of discretion and
of its exercise. Rather, the self-abnegation was the very product of the
realization that judicial input was inevitable, substantial, and controversial. If
the rhetoric of impersonality served as a response to critics of the judiciary, it
also operated, among serious and conscientious men, as a limit upon self.2 4 9
If an employee benefit plan is a deal between employer and employee, the
judge can legitimate his or her choice of a rule of limited obligation from that
premise. The judge who wants to impose a more altruistic obligation on the
employer has greater difficulty justifying her decision, except on the basis of
fact-intensive arguments about unfairness or irrationality. That line of
reasoning, however, reveals how deeply the judge is involved in defining the
obligations of employer to employee.
The disavowing of the possibility of dividing unanticipated losses
according to some notion of fairness, and the refusal to adopt rules that might
do justice in particular cases, flow from an appropriate concern about the
genuine difficulties of administering rules that do not allow a complete
capitulation to managerial prerogative. As the stakes have grown higher in
employee benefit cases, as the nature of the disputes has become publicized and
politicized, formalism has grown more appealing.250 In the absence of social or
legal consensus as to whose expectations to protect, judges become more
vulnerable to attack for deciding cases by imposing their own views rather than
249 COVER, supra note 84, at 147.
250 In the years when ERISA was being debated, one saw a similar retreat to
formalism in pension cases in which employees with long years of service were denied
pensions for failure to comply with some rule of eligibility. For example, one court
remarked:
[W]e sympathize with plaintiffs' views that, after long years of faithful service with the
Company which was concluded through no fault of their own, they ought to receive
some pension benefits. However that may be, the clear language of four collective
bargaining agreements between plaintiffs' union and the Company stands between
plaintiffs and their requested recovery. Minnesota contract law compels the conclusion
that where, as here, an employer and a union bargain time and again over employees'
working conditions and establish specific requirements for the vesting of pension
benefits, the courts must hold the parties to strict compliance with the terms of the
contract.
... Courts must enforce contracts which may be morally and economically
unreasonable, and so long as the law permits bloodless pension plans, we cannot supply
this one with corpuscular circulation.
Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the law. The judge, says Duncan Kennedy, "can respond to this with legalistic
mumbo jumbo, that is, by appealing to the concepts and pretending that they
have decided the case for him. Or he can take the risks inherent in
acknowledging the full extent of his discretion." 25 1 The embrace of "legalistic
mumbo jumbo," my study suggests, is an understandable judicial response
when confronted with complicated cases that require explicit moral choices. 25 2
An additional, and related, explanation for the formalism of the courts'
common law is a hostility to overt judicial intervention in the society or the
economy. The same judicial reluctance about ameliorative intervention in
matters of social justice such as school desegregation, and the same minimalist
approach to statutory interpretation that has led to hostility to implied statutory
rights, is at work in these cases.253 The courts' only task, as they see it, is to
identify and to enforce the terms of the parties' agreement. The courts neither
make or remake agreements nor judge the fairness of terms. All that is required
for their task is a set of rules to apply. Formalism in legal reasoning is the
product of laissez-faire as a legal philosophy.
Yet, formalist analysis is peculiarly inappropriate for mediating in an
ongoing relationship. As I have suggested above, the law of contracts not only
does not describe the mutual obligations in a long-term relationship, it does
violence to the relationship when it is forced into the task. This has long been
the received wisdom about interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
When resolution of a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement turns on
an ambiguous provision, resort to "rules or canons of interpretation is neither
practical nor helpful."2 54 Courts "cannot, by occasional sporadic decision,
restore the parties' continuing relationship" and their intervention may do as
much harm as good.25 5 Rather, "[iun the last analysis, what is sought is a wise
251 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1732.
252 Perhaps too, as Duncan Kennedy hypothesized, there is a connection between a
formalist discourse of rigid rules and substantive rulings of limited liability. In particular,
Kennedy theorized that the twentieth-century erosion of igid rides was causally linked to a
socialization of the legal theory; that "[t]here is a connection, in the rhetoric of private law,
between individualism and a preference for rules, and between altruism and a preference
for standards," in that the same economic, political, and moral arguments tend to appear in
defense of each. Id. at 1776.
253 The Supreme Court's increasing unwillingness over the last 20 years to find
implied private rights of action in protective statutes is traced in CHEMERINSKY, supra note
52, § 6.3.3. See also Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Puivate
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1317 (1982).
254 Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV.
999, 1016 (1955).
255 ld. at 1024.
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judgment. It is judgment, said Holmes, that the world pays for." 25 6 But faith to
the role of the judge is thought to be inconsistent with deciding cases according
to this sort of "wise judgment" that is valued in arbitrators. To craft a body of
rules that recognizes diffuse obligations arising from complex relationships is
contrary to the intellectual habits of the federal judiciary. And, as I suggest in
the next section, it would tax the coufts institutionally as well.
Law and economics thinking also tends to generate formalism in legal
analysis. Formalist analysis generally favors bright-line rules; bright-line rules
are in turn valued because they are predictable and therefore encourage
transactions and reduce transaction costs. Further, rules give the illusion that
judges intervene less in the economy than if judges were to attempt to decide
cases based on moral judgments. And the courts' preferred rules appear to save
courts time and to reduce the costs of dispute resolution. The reasoning that
excludes extrinsic evidence of promises, that rejects estoppel theories or
interpretation against the drafter, or any other protective standard, is generally
justified by the claim that an attempt to intervene in the relationship to protect
the employee will be counterproductive. 25 7 This proposition is a standard
classical economic argument in favor of laissez-faire: "the theory is that
permitting A to injure B may be the best way to save B from injury." 25 8 As I
suggested above, this argument may have considerable force in some contexts,
but in others it does not. The point is that some judges have adopted law and
economics thinking without apparent awareness of its limits in any given case.
The ideology shapes the legal consciousness, which shapes the discourse,
which in turn perpetuates the consciousness.
C. Bounded Obligations and Federal Common Law
Many have observed that the ideology of voluntarism and the reality of
human association are fundamentally at odds. The premises of voluntarism are
2 56 Id. at 1016.
257 E.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 398 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993); Sen v.
United Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 817 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2992 (1992); Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir.
1990); cf. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (noting in dicta that preemption of state protective legislation
may be desirable because "[a] patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce
considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers
with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting
them").25 8 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1743.
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that the parties in a relationship should define the terms of the relationship for
themselves; voluntarism envisions a world of independent actors who create
themselves and their relationships by making "determinate arrangements with
predictable outcomes." 25 9 The reality of human association in the employment
context is otherwise. The parties demand and expect commitment and loyalty;
their relationship is one of interdependence, not simply reciprocity. The
structure of the relationship transcends the subjective agreement or
understanding of any particular individuals. 260 All of this is explicitly
acknowledged in the context of collective bargaining: the need for a specialized
legal structure to translate the social norms of industrial justice and self-
government into legally enforceable norms is at the core of the importance of
labor arbitration.261 Indeed, the voluntarist system in the context of a long-term
relationship could not work if it relied on litigation and judicial decision for
enforcement.
The problem in the employment context is precisely that there is no legal
institution capable of the delicate task of facilitating resolution of conflict and
translating inchoate expectations in informal practices into legal commands.
Courts retreat to formalism because the alternative model of arbitration and ad
hoc decisionmaking is inconsistent with their vision of the federal judicial role.
The abstract formalism and the narrow rules of liability thus stem in part
from the fact that courts must invent the rules with little aid from the statute
and none from an expert agency. To translate diffuse social obligations into
rules of law is difficult for an institution that does not have the ability that
arbitrators have to decide cases on an ad hoc basis, to make clear compromises,
to wander around the workplace to assess the likely impact of decisions and the
justification for claims. Making normative choices among competing concerns,
wading through long and conflicting testimony, and assessing the likely effects
of rules on the conduct of others are tasks that, in some other areas of federal
labor relations law, administrative agencies do in the first instance. Here, the
federal courts do the task largely without the assistance even of the Department
of Labor.262
259 SLzNICK, supra note 128, at 55.
260 Id.
261 See Shulman, supra note 254, at 1024.
2 62 The Department of Labor promulgates regulations that play an important role in
refining and fleshing out ERISA's commands with respect to fiduciary obligations in plan
asset management as well as pension plan termination, and reporting and disclosure
requirements for all plans. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510-2580.412-36 (1993). The Labor
Department has not, however, issued any regulations dealing with the problem of welfare
plan amendments.
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The courts' institutional concerns are manifest at a mundane level as well.
To create rules in which obligations would arise from beyond the scope of plan
documents would make fewer cases susceptible to resolution on summary
judgment.263 Without an agency to make detailed factual determinations in the
first instance, courts would commit themselves to a great deal more work if
they were to adopt rules (such as estoppel or unjust enrichment) that demand
inquiry into patterns of behavior and expectations that span the course of many
years. And the work would not be easy. Arbitrating disputes over
responsibility for the financial security of employees at their most vulnerable
moments is a wrenching task. It is difficult to design rules that will most
equitably balance the welfare of employees against the need to protect
employers from unanticipated liabilities that might ultimately undermine the
private employee benefit system. Further, courts express concern that liability
issues might turn largely on the self-serving testimony of employees and
employers about who said what to whom and when, creating incentives to
distort, stretch, or ignore the truth.264
The complex and diffuse nature of the expectations and obligations in the
employment relationship necessarily makes any effort to define and enforce
legal obligations correspondingly complex. Because ERISA does not explicitly
deal with this issue, but preempts all state law that might do so, federal courts
have had to develop a legal structure as a matter of federal common law. Ever
since the Supreme Court announced in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins that "Itihere
is no federal general common law," federal courts have been reluctant to create
it without clear authorization from Congress. 265 In ERISA cases, this
reluctance has been manifested in an effort to create as few liabilities as
possible.
Since Erie, there has been no general federal common law of contract. To
the extent that federal courts handle contracts cases (in diversity), they apply
state law of contract. They do not see their role as being to develop or to
expand the state contract law, but simply to apply the rules as articulated by the
state courts. Applying existing rules is a project quite different from being
responsible for the development of new ones; rule application is likely to
prompt a more mechanistic and conservative approach to adjudication than rule
creation. 266
263 See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 605, 609 (7th Cir.) (plurality
opinion), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
264 See id. at 607.
265 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
266 On the nature of common-law adjudication, see generally MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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The federal courts have authority to create federal common law when
Congress intends that they do so. 267 Thus, for example, following the Supreme
Court's direction in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,268 courts created
most of the law governing collective bargaining agreements under the authority
of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which made such agreements
enforceable in federal court but did not provide any substantive provisions to
govern them.269 The legislative history of ERISA makes it clear that Congress
intended that courts create a body of federal common law to govern ERISA
cases, and indeed, Congress even referred to section 301.270
Thus, there is federal common law, notwithstanding what the Court said in
Erie. At times, the difference between statutory interpretation and the creation
of federal common law to fill gaps in a statute is not readily apparent,
particularly in ERISA cases. 271 Yet the very definition of federal common law
makes it clear that the question of the employer's power to eliminate previously
promised welfare benefits must be dealt with as a matter of common law: the
problem calls for a "rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some
authoritative federal text." 272
ERISA calls on the federal courts, in the limited area of employee benefits,
to pick up where they left off when Erie was decided in 1938 and to engage in
a broadly conceived task of creating and applying a modern common law of
contract informed by ERISA's voluntarist and regulatory aims. Regrettably,
courts have not been nearly as adventuresome or as creative in creating
common law under ERISA as they have been in creating common law under
section 301 of Taft-Hartley. Rather than tackle the problem of designing a body
of law that would reconcile divergent and inchoate expectations, the courts
have attempted to duck the problem entirely by creating as few liabilities as
possible. The absence of common-law rules defaults to private power, which
resides largely in the employer's hands.
267 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
52, § 6.3.
268 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
269 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
270 See sources cited supra note 52.
271 See, e.g., Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, s There Life for Erie After the
Death of Diveraty? 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (arguing that the difference between
statutory interpretation and creation of federal common law to fill gaps in statute is one of
degree).
272 Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cml. L.
RaV. 1, 5 (1985); see also Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, § 6.1.
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The reasons for the courts' reluctance are several. Unlike section 301,
ERISA appears at first glance to be just as the Supreme Court described it: a
"comprehensive and reticulated" statute that requires no interstitial
lawmaking.273 As the Court said in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Russell, "[w]e are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted
with such evident care as the one in ERISA."2 74 Section 301 makes the need
for federal common law obvious by providing absolutely no substantive rules
itself; in ERISA the need is less obvious because the statute governs many
areas in fine detail. The trouble with the Court's approach in ERISA cases is
the erroneous assumption that the statutory scheme is comprehensive and was
crafted with such care as to foreclose judicial supplementation. 275
There are other reasons for the courts' reluctance to create common law
under ERISA. In the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has been
increasingly unwilling to create federal common law; in the lincoln Mills era,
the Court was less grudging.2 76 The Court's unwillingness to create federal
common law is grounded in separation of powers and federalism concerns: the
Court does not want to trench upon the lawmaking authority of Congress or of
the states. But those concerns are not implicated in ERISA cases. Congress
plainly intended that courts supplement the statutory regime, and thus, there is
no question of impinging upon Congress's domain. And by preempting all state
law, Congress intended the states to have no role in regulating employee
benefits. Therefore a federal common law of employee benefits will raise no
federalism problems that have not already been raised by ERISA's
extraordinarily broad preemption provision.
Indeed, it is the sweeping breadth of ERISA preemption that makes the
federal courts' reluctance to deal with these issues so problematic. Although
state common law regulation of employment has many failings, ERISA has
made matters worse by preempting the efforts of those state courts and
legislatures willing to grapple with the problem.
273 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980). There
is a similarity between the Court's reluctance to supplement ERISA's remedial scheme and
the Court's reluctance to create a private right of action. Compare Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) with Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In both cases, the Court reasoned that the existence of some
remedies in the statute evidenced Congress's desire that the statutory remedies be exclusive.
The Court seems to think that if the statute is comprehensive as to some subjects, Congress
must have intended to leave others unregulated.
274 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985).
275 See generally George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages
Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611 (1994).
276 1 am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky for pointing this out to me.
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Before ERISA ousted state law from the benefits field, the state courts had
developed an extensive body of common law contract and trust principles for
plans, and some of the law was more favorable to employees than the federal
law that has replaced it.277 For instance, state courts held that plans should be
construed against the employers that drafted them and "liberally in favor of the
employee." 278 The federal courts do not. To take another example, state courts
had struggled with the problem of employers invoking boilerplate provisions
that allowed unfettered discretion to eliminate promised benefits, and the courts
were beginning to come down on the side of employees. As the Ohio Supreme
Court reasoned in a much-cited case, "under our present economic system, an
employer cannot offer a retirement system as an inducement to employment
and, after an employee has accepted employment under such circumstances,
withdraw or terminate the program after an employee has complied with all the
conditions entitling him to retirement rights thereunder." 279 The court
acknowledged the existence of the provision allowing the employer to amend or
terminate the plan, but found it all but immaterial in the face of the common
use of pensions as a form of deferred compensation to induce long service in an
economy that depends on stability of employment.280 The Ohio Supreme Court
277 See Flint, supra note 275, at 649-56.
27 8 Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 121 n.4 (4th Cir. 1971); accord
Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1978) (applying Massachusetts law, but
citing law from other states), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); Ehrle v. Bank Bldg. &
Equip. Corp., 530 S.W.2d 482, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("It is firmly established that the
terms of a plan formulated by an employer in behalf of his employees, even if gratuitously
instituted, are to be taken most strongly against the employer."); Stopford v. Boonton
Molding Co., 265 A.2d 657, 665 (N.J. 1970); Davilla v. Court Employment Project, Inc.,
383 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (Civ. Ct. 1976). But see Alt v. Long Island R.R., 365 N.Y.S.2d
480, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1975) ("Where the provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be
strictly construed and the Court may not rewrite the plan."), aff'd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 610
(1976).
279 Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ohio 1960).
280 Id.; accord Hoefel, 581 F.2d at 5-6; Rochester, 450 F.2d at 122; Hurd v. Hutnik,
419 F. Supp. 630, 655 (D.N.J. 1976) ("Though the legal framework of the fund and its
relationship to the collective bargaining parties were purportedly constructed to prevent the
assumption of responsibility by the employers for the representations made to the
employees, a court of equity will not permit the reasonable and justified expectations of
those employees, knowingly wielded by the employers for whom they labored for so many
years, to be frustrated in this manner."); Miller v. Dictaphone Corp., 334 F. Supp. 840,
842 (D. Ore. 1971); Stopford, 265 A.2d at 665; Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 229,
230 (Ohio 1967). But see Kolentus v. AVCO Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 955-58 (7th Cir. 1986)
(applying pre-ERISA law, electing to follow Boase rather than Hoefel line of cases), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir.
1970).
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even so held in a case involving insurance benefits other than pensions, which
is obviously far beyond what courts have been willing to do under ERISA.281
One wonders whether some employer support for ERISA was not
motivated by a fear, which might well have existed by 1974, that state courts
were likely to protect employees more vigorously than the federal courts would
under ERISA.282 In any event, what is apparent is that before ERISA, courts
exhibited a certain creativity and skepticism about legal doctrine, and a
willingness to regard traditional legal categories and employer defenses as
"legal fiction" and thus to cast them aside in an effort to do justice in particular
cases.283 The results were by no means uniformly pro-employee; many courts
were as formalist before ERISA as the federal courts have been since.284 But
some employees did recover, and the rules that had traditionally limited
employer liability became less efficient.
The aspects of the employment relationship implicated in welfare benefits,
and the legal framework to address them, are traditionally concerns of state
281 Sheehy, 227 N.E.2d at 230.
282 In this respect, employer support for the enactment of ERISA would be somewhat
similar to employer support for the enactment of workers' compensation in the second
decade of this century: employers in both circumstances noted emerging trends in cases in
favor of employees and supported "moderate" reform legislation for fear that the state
courts would ultimately accomplish more as a matter of common law than the legislation
would achieve. See JAMES WEINsTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE:
1900-1918, at 40-61 (1968); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and
the Law ofIndustriaIAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967).
283 E.g., Gould v. Continental Coffee Co., 304 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), in
which the court said, in allowing a plaintiff to recover a pension:
In the instant case, the trustees are both defendant's agents and its principal officers
and/or directors. Thus, despite the practical identity of interest which exists between the
corporation and its trustees, defendant argues that there is a legal distinction between the
trustees who declared plaintiffs forfeiture and the corporation which seeks to disavow
any responsibility therefor. Such distinction is at best a legal fiction and cannot be
recognized by this Court.
Ld. Thus, the "two-hats" distinction that has been so universally accepted in current ERISA
cases was at least sometimes rejected as fiction in pre-ERISA cases. See supra text
accompanying notes 149-56.
284 E.g., Dwyer v. Climatrol Indus. Inc., 544 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 932 (1977); Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Boase v. Lee
Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1970); Alfaro v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 362
N.E.2d 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). One wonders whether a thorough survey of the case law
would reveal a greater conservatism among federal courts than among state courts of the
era. My preliminary research suggests there was such a tendency.
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common law of contracts and trusts. Many federal forays into the employment
issues that were traditionally matters of state law avoided problems by not
preempting state law (as in the case of wages and hours regulation 285) or by
establishing joint state-federal enforcement regimes (as in the case of
antidiscrimination law286) so that the state machinery was not entirely shoved
aside. Broad preemption of state law regulating unions and collective
bargaining worked to the extent that it has in part because the Supreme Court
took up the task of defining federal labor policy and in part because Congress
gave the rest of the task to the National Labor Relations Board. With neither an
expert agency nor the federal courts able and willing to articulate the policy, to
decide the tens of thousands of cases, and to control the flow of litigation,
federal preemption of issues that were traditionally concerns of state law has
been problematic.
One should not overlook that these cases involve courts in issues that they
regard as being at the periphery of the concerns of federal law. Labor relations
has become a matter of federal law in the union sector, and some aspects of the
employment relationship are commonly litigated in federal courts, notably
safety and health,287 and discrimination, 288 but implied contractual promises
are otherwise governed by state common law. The doctrines at issue here-of
the law of trusts and contracts-are traditional concerns of state law with which
federal courts have limited experience. Finally, one should not underestimate
the adverse reaction to the very notion of ERISA-it is widely regarded as
being complicated, technical, confusing, boring, and decidedly unsexy. When
the courts set about deciding cases involving complicated bodies of law with
which many of the judges and most of their clerks have little familiarity and
even less interest, one should not be surprised to discover that the opinions do
not reflect the best of the federal courts' intellectual output.28 9
V. CONCLUSION
The failure of Congress to enact health care reform despite the apparent
popularity of the idea in the 1992 election illustrates the intractability of the
285 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
286 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(h)(6) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
2 87 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
288 Civil Rights Act of 1964 (ritle VIi), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
289 1 am not the first to notice that the Supreme Court's ERISA jurisprudence is of
rather uneven quality. See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Funks Trusts, 1990 SUP.
CT. REV. 207, 228-29.
[Vol. 56:153
LOCHNER REDlUX
voluntarism-entitlement tension in health insurance. The Clinton
Administration's health financing reform proposal would have transformed
basic health insurance into an entitlement by mandating that employers provide
certain coverage and guaranteeing coverage for the unemployed. 290 The demise
of proposals for radical health care reform suggests that the episode of legal
development I have described here is not soon to be consigned to the dustbin of
legal history. Even if some reform were passed mandating that employers
provide minimum benefits, to the extent that employers provide benefits
beyond the statutorily mandated minimum, the same problem of contract will
arise. And, with respect to employee benefits other than health insurance, the
same problems remain. Moreover, most of the proposals that were introduced
in the 103rd Congress did not resolve the voluntarist-entitlement tensions. Nor
can the tension be resolved except to the extent that the proposals eschew
employer incentives in favor of mandates (as did the Clinton Administration
plan291 and the single-payer plan292). So long as Congress relies on voluntary
private finance of health care, the tension between voluntarism and entitlements
will persist.
As long as ERISA maintains the voluntarist strategy, courts will have to
resort to some sort of contract principles for defining and enforcing obligations.
But courts do have a choice in the kinds of contract rules they apply. The
narrow and formalist rules that courts have chosen do violence to the statutory
language and purpose. Without minimizing the institutional constraints on
courts that make such rules particularly appealing, I hope I have shown the
potential benefits of a system of rules that recognize the diffuse nature of
obligations in the employment relationship. Estoppel theories and rules of
interpretation that are more sensitive to the reality of adhesion contracts in the
nonunion sector will doubtless make ERISA litigation even more complicated
and difficult than it already is. Yet, however much judges may wish that
Congress had assigned these value choices and factual inquiries to a specialized
administrative agency, they are tasks that are not beyond the competence or the
responsibility of the federal courts.
Skeptics might respond that judicial doubt as to competence or
responsibility is not the issue and that the conservatism of the federal judiciary
is. It seems to me to be too reductionist to believe that the apparent anti-
employee bias in these cases is simply a product of the ideology of the judiciary
and the law. That being so, it is worth showing that there are alternative paths
290 National Health Security Act, H.R. 1691, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Apr.
5, 1993).
291 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Nov. 20, 1993); H.R. 1691, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Apr. 5, 1993).292 H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Mar. 3, 1993).
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that courts could follow in applying the statutory protections to the reality of
the employment relationship. It has not been my project to explore in detail
exactly what those paths might be, but rather to reveal and to account for the
flaws in the path that the courts have taken. The best argument for that path not
taken is that employees, those who depend on them for support, and the
legitimacy of the law would be well-served by a more candid and creative
approach to the problem of social insurance in the private welfare state.
